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Deporting the Pardoned 
Jason A. Cade* 
Federal immigration laws make noncitizens deportable on the basis of 
state criminal convictions. Historically, Congress implemented this scheme 
in ways that respected the states’ sovereignty over their criminal laws. As 
more recent federal laws have been interpreted, however, a state’s decision 
to pardon, expunge, or otherwise set aside a conviction under state law 
will often have no effect on the federal government’s determination to use 
that conviction as a basis for deportation. While scholars have shown 
significant interest in state and local laws regulating immigrants, few have 
considered the federalism implications of federal rules that ignore a state’s 
authority to determine the continuing validity of its own convictions. 
This Article contends that limitations on the preclusive effect of pardons, 
expungements, appeals, and similar post-conviction processes undermine 
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sovereign interests in maintaining the integrity of the criminal justice 
system, calibrating justice, fostering rehabilitation, and deciding where to 
allocate resources. In light of the interests at stake, Congress should be 
required to clearly express its intent to override pardons and related state 
post-conviction procedures. A federalism-based clear statement rule for 
statutory provisions that restrict generally applicable criminal processes 
would not constrain the federal government’s power to set immigration 
policy. Congress remains free to make its intent clear in the statute. But 
the rule would ensure that Congress, rather than an administrative 
agency, has made the deliberative choice to upset the usual constitutional 
balance of federal and state power. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On May 24, 2010, just after Arizona Governor Janice Brewer signed 
the controversial, anti-immigrant S.B. 1070 into law,1 New York 
Governor David Paterson created a special panel to expedite review of 
pardon applications from immigrants deportable as a result of past 
criminal convictions. As Paterson made clear in statements to the 
press, the purpose of the panel was to counter “extremely inflexible” 
deportation laws and to “set an example for how to soften the blow in 
those cases of deserving individuals caught in the web of our national 
immigration laws.”2 Over the next six months, the pardon panel 
received about 1,100 pardon petitions.3 In December of 2010, Paterson 
issued full and unconditional pardons to thirty-three noncitizens.4 
The noncitizens pardoned by Paterson all had reformed following a 
single conviction in the 1970s, 80s or 90s.5 Most of their convictions 
 
 1 See Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, ch. 13, 2010 
Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, amended by Act of Apr. 30, 2010, ch. 211, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 
1070. At the time of its passage, S.B. 1070 contained the most restrictive state 
regulations affecting immigrants in the country. Its explicit purpose was to 
“discourage and deter the unlawful entry and presence of aliens and economic activity 
by persons unlawfully present in the United States” and to cause immigrant “attrition 
through enforcement.” Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act, 
ch. 13, sec. 1, 2010 Ariz. Sess. Laws 450, 450. On June 25, 2012, the Supreme Court 
enjoined three significant provisions of S.B. 1070 as preempted. See Arizona v. United 
States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2510 (2012). 
 2 Diana Carlton, Paterson wades into national immigration debate with ‘pardon’ 
panel, CAPITOL CONFIDENTIAL (May 5, 2010, 5:19 PM), http://blog.timesunion.com/ 
capitol/archives/44299/paterson-wades-into-national-immigration-debate-with-pardon-
panel. 
 3 See Patrick Young, Paterson’s Pardon Panel Deserves to be Made Permanent, LONG 
ISLAND WINS (Jan. 3, 2011), http://www.longislandwins.com/index.php/blog/post/ 
patersons_pardon_panel_deserves_to_be_made_permanent. 
 4 Because media accounts were unclear about the total number of pardons 
Governor Paterson granted, I submitted a request to the state’s Department of 
Corrections, pursuant to New York’s Freedom of Information Law (FOIL). See NEW 
YORK DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, F.O.I.L. UNIT, Foil 
Log No. 12-0054: NY Gubernatorial Pardons 1 (Jan. 23, 2012) (listing pardons granted 
by New York Governors since 2003) (on file with author).  
 5 See Press Release, Governor of New York State, Governor Paterson Announces 
Pardons (Dec. 24, 2010), available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/archive/paterson/ 
press/122410-GovPatersonAnnouncesPardons.html. A few of the noncitizens had 
concurrent but still relatively minor convictions. See id.  
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became deportable offenses retroactively. One recipient of a pardon 
was Francisco Moya de Leon, a lawful permanent resident of the 
United States since 1988 whose wife and children are U.S. citizens. 
When Moya de Leon applied for naturalization in 2009, the 
immigration agency denied his application and put him into removal 
proceedings on the basis of a 1994 drug possession conviction, despite 
strong equities and an otherwise clear record.6 
One might think Paterson’s Christmastime pardon of Moya de Leon 
promised a happy conclusion. Whether exercised by a state governor 
or the President, a full and unconditional pardon is generally 
understood to be a final judgment by the chief executive of a sovereign 
government that a conviction under that sovereign’s law no longer 
stands.7 And Moya de Leon’s pardon, like the others that Paterson 
granted to noncitizens, contained language explicitly releasing him 
from “all sentences, judgments and executions” based on the 
conviction, even specifically mentioning “relief from removal.”8 
Unfortunately for Moya de Leon, the Board of Immigration Appeals 
(“BIA” or “Board”) has held that a pardon will not remove the 
immigration consequences of a conviction for a controlled substance 
offense. Indeed, as the BIA has interpreted the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (“INA”),9 a pardon by the President of the United 
States or a state governor will only preclude deportation on the basis 
of certain (albeit important) categories of convictions. Nor are pardons 
the only state process that, despite otherwise eliminating, deferring, or 
undoing convictions, are deemed to have limited effect in immigration 
proceedings. Under current rules, a noncitizen may be deported on the 
basis of a conviction pending on direct appeal, judicially expunged, or 
 
 6 See id. (noting, among other factors, that one of Moya de Leon’s children grew 
up to become a police officer). 
 7 See infra Part II. The power structures and procedures of state pardon 
mechanisms vary, but all states appear to provide for a central or at least strong role for 
the governor in the decision-making process. See Margaret Colgate Love, Relief from the 
Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction: A State-By-State Resource Guide, THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT (June 2008), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/ 
detail/publication.cfm?publication_id=115 [hereinafter Relief]. 
 8 See, e.g., Pardon of Francisco Moya de Leon by Governor David Paterson 1 
(Dec. 22, 2010) (on file with author); Pardon of [redacted] by Governor David 
Paterson (Dec. 30, 2010) (on file with author). 
 9 The INA comprehensively sets forth the terms of admission for noncitizens and 
the circumstances under which they will become removable from the United States. 
See generally Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 
(1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537). 
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treated as a deferred adjudication or suspended sentence under state 
law.10 
Scholars have paid little attention to these federal immigration rules 
and their implications for the constitutional balance of federal and 
state power. While the proliferation of sub-federal laws affecting 
immigrants has inspired an abundance of academic and political 
interest, that interest is focused primarily on whether state or local 
laws that regulate immigrants infringe on federal authority.11 But as 
federal immigration policy becomes increasingly intertwined with 
state criminal enforcement, core state structures are impacted in 
significant ways.12 Some of the federal rules run counter to state 
criminal justice interests, intruding on state autonomy in 
underappreciated and perhaps unintended ways. 
In making deportation laws hinge on convictions under the laws of 
any sovereign, Congress relies heavily on state criminal procedures 
that identify, prosecute, and sentence noncitizens. Through this 
choice, which represents huge resource-savings benefits to the federal 
government, Congress has in essence incorporated state laws of 
general applicability into the federal regulatory scheme. This is not a 
new scheme,13 nor is it unique to immigration regulation.14 But until 
 
 10 See infra Part I.D. 
 11 The scholarship being generated in this area is too voluminous to fully cite. For 
a sampling, see Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State 
Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251, 252 (2011); Clare 
Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
787, 789-92 (2008); Michael A. Olivas, Immigration-Related State and Local 
Ordinances: Preemption, Prejudice, and the Proper Role for Enforcement, 2007 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 27, 28 (2007); Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in 
Immigration Reform, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 567 (2008); Juliet Stumpf, States of 
Confusion: The Rise of State and Local Power Over Immigration, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1557, 
1557 (2008). For an informative account of how state laws and actors use immigration 
status in criminal prosecution and sentencing to both advantage and disadvantage 
defendants, see Gabriel J. Chin, Illegal Entry as Crime, Deportation as Punishment: 
Immigration Status and the Criminal Process, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1417, 1423, 1433 
(2011). 
 12 See, e.g., Jason A. Cade, The Plea Bargain Crisis for Noncitizens in Misdemeanor 
Court, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. (forthcoming June 2013) (manuscript at 34-39) (on file 
with author) (arguing that federal immigration enforcement programs targeting 
noncitizens in the criminal justice system sometimes create overwhelming incentives 
to plead guilty to minor crimes regardless of immigration status, the strength of the 
prosecutor’s case, or underlying guilt).  
 13 The federal government has been deporting citizens on the basis of state 
convictions since the Immigration Act of 1917. See infra Part I.B.2. 
 14 Deportation is only one of many federal collateral consequences that Congress 
has attached to state convictions. See generally ABA COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIMINAL 
SANCTIONS, INTERNAL EXILE: COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION IN FEDERAL 
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relatively recently, federal immigration law respected post-conviction 
state processes such as pardons, appeals, and expungements, as well as 
alternative dispositions such as deferred adjudications and suspended 
sentences.15 
By giving preclusive effect to these core state processes, the 
historical approach preserved interests at the heart of state autonomy. 
Though less frequently used in recent times, pardons have been a vital 
tool of governance since the earliest known legal codes.16 Rooted in 
sovereignty, pardons were integral to the power to punish from 
colonial times to at least the early twentieth century.17 Appeals, 
deferred adjudications, and expungements also comprise integral 
components of the states’ administration of their general criminal 
laws. Individually and collectively, these processes work to ensure 
systemic integrity, correct errors, calibrate punishment, encourage 
rehabilitation, conserve judicial and penal resources, and remove civil 
disabilities.18 
In view of the significant systemic interests at stake, the relevant 
statutory rules should be read to avoid conflicts with state authority to 
the extent possible. Statutory construction based on implication or 
extrapolation is insufficient in this context; rather, Congress should be 
required to make its intent to override pardons or other core state 
post-conviction processes explicit in the statute. Where plausible 
doubts can be raised about a construction that encroaches on a state’s 
sovereign criminal powers, courts should interpret the statute to 
preserve state authority. This clear statement rule — a federalism 
canon — would ensure that Congress, rather than an administrative 
agency, has made the considered and deliberate decision to upset the 
usual balance of powers in our dual sovereign system. Lacking the 
binding force of Marbury-style judicial review, however, the federalism 
canon would not prevent Congress from subsequently clarifying its 
intent in the text of the statute. 
The Supreme Court has long used a variety of federalism canons to 
shore up state authority against federal encroachment, even where 
 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS (Jan. 2009), available at http://www.pdsdc.org/resources/ 
publication/collateral%20consequences%20of%20conviction%20in%20federal%20laws
%20and%20regulations.pdf (describing the negative effects that may result from 
pleading guilty or nolo contendere to various crimes).  
 15 See infra Parts I.B, I.D. 
 16 See KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
15 (1989) (describing the history of the pardon power since the Babylonian Code of 
Hammurabi). 
 17 See infra Part II.B. 
 18 See infra Part II. 
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Congress acts within its enumerated constitutional powers.19 On the 
other hand, the Court has never employed a federalism canon in the 
context of immigration regulation. This absence is perhaps not overly 
surprising given the deference long accorded the federal government 
in setting deportation policy.20 Although the power to regulate the 
selection and exclusion of immigrants is not enumerated in the 
Constitution, the Court decreed in the late nineteenth century that 
Congress has plenary power to regulate immigration as a corollary of 
national sovereignty.21 This high degree of deference has allowed 
Congress to regulate immigrants in ways that would never be 
permissible if applied to citizens.22 The interpretive rule I propose does 
no injury to the federal government’s immigration authority, however 
plenary it might be. Indeed, the Court already employs a variety of 
other clear statement rules in immigration cases, such as the more 
generalized canon of constitutional avoidance and the presumption 
against retroactivity.23 These tools of statutory construction require a 
higher than usual degree of clarity in the text of a statute when 
 
 19 See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 619-29 (1992) 
(discussing the Court’s use of “super strong clear statement rules” to protect 
federalism values). 
 20 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: 
Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545, 546-57 
(1990) (describing how the plenary doctrine declares that Congress and the Executive 
have often exclusive authority over immigration decisions). 
 21 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The right 
of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized, or taken any 
steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is 
as absolute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into 
the country.”) 
 22 For a sampling of the hundreds of scholarly articles discussing the plenary 
power doctrine, most of which are critical, see Laura J. Arandes, Life Without Parole: 
An Immigration Framework Applied to Potentially Indefinite Detention at Guantanamo 
Bay, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1046, 1056-59 (2011); Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation’s Last 
Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. 
REV. 1, 6-7 (1998); Kevin R. Johnson, Race and Immigration Law and Enforcement: A 
Response to Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine?, 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 289, 296-97 
(2000); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO. IMMIG. L.J. 339, 
339-41 (2002); Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of 
Confinement and the Porous Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, 22 HASTINGS CONST. 
L.Q. 1087, 1133-35 (1995). 
 23 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299, 315 (2001) (employing both these 
canons to construe the INA to: (1) not preclude habeas jurisdiction; and (2) not 
retroactively eliminate discretionary relief to deportation). 
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constitutional concerns are at stake, even if these concerns fall short of 
actual limits on congressional authority.24 
As federal immigration policies become increasingly intertwined 
with state criminal justice structures, a federalism canon may be 
essential to ensure that traditional state authority over generally 
applicable governmental processes like the administration of criminal 
justice is not lightly or inadvertently disregarded. The justifications for 
the use of the federalism canon in other areas apply with at least as 
much force in the immigration context.25 Reliance on the national 
political process, for instance, is unlikely to adequately safeguard the 
federalism interests at stake, because the individuals most affected by 
deportation rules often have relatively little political power. An 
interpretive rule requiring Congress to express its intention to 
override a pardon or appeal clearly in the statute would increase the 
likelihood that legislators actually confront the federalism issues.26 
Although I analyze the implications of the federal rules for a range 
of state post-conviction processes, my focus is on the pardon 
restrictions.27 The first two Parts of this Article place the immigration 
rules that limit these kinds of state processes in context. Part I 
illustrates how Congress attaches federal deportation consequences to 
criminal conduct punishable by states. Drawing in part on early 
immigration files held at the National Archives, I show that pardons 
and other post-conviction processes have long been considered 
 
 24 See John F. Manning, Clear Statement Rules and the Constitution, 110 COLUM. L. 
REV. 399, 406-07 (2010) (explaining that clear statement rules “insist that Congress 
speak with unusual clarity when it wishes to effect a result that, although 
constitutional, would disturb a constitutionally inspired value”); see, e.g., Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575 (2006) (requiring a clear statement from Congress to 
replace traditional adjudication procedures in terrorism prosecutions). Larry Solan has 
observed that the Supreme Court may sometimes employ clear statement rules, for 
example in national security cases like Hamdan, where there is reason to be concerned 
with “an excessively broad interpretation of a legitimate statute by the executive.” 
LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES: LAWS AND THEIR INTERPRETATION 
193-94 (2010). Such concerns also have force in the immigration context, where the 
executive branch’s interpretation of statutory law has tremendous impact on the 
implementation of immigration policy. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Christina M. 
Rodriguez, The President and Immigration Law, 119 YALE L.J. 458, 492-510 (2009) 
(describing how the Executive uses both inherent and delegated powers to drive 
immigration policy). 
 25 See infra Part III. 
 26 See infra Part III. 
 27 I focus on the pardon restrictions primarily for reasons of scope. Additionally, 
the fact that pardons issue from the chief executive (in almost every state) and are 
theorized as integral components of the power to punish foregrounds the threat to 
state sovereignty posed by imposing limitations. See infra Part II. 
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preclusive of removal in immigration proceedings. Part II situates 
these state criminal processes within the dual sovereign constitutional 
structure and reviews the functions that these powers play in 
governance, specifically addressing the implications of the federal 
immigration constraints for state autonomy. Part III then argues that 
Congress should be required to make its intent to override pardons 
and other core state criminal processes unmistakably clear. As I hope 
to demonstrate, the application of a federalism canon in the 
immigration context is justified where federal law intrudes on 
generally applicable criminal processes. Applying the federalism canon 
to the INA, there is insufficient clarity that Congress intended to limit 
the effect of pardons to remove the immigration consequences of state 
convictions. Finally, I briefly address some of the considerations for 
applying the federalism canon to other state post-conviction processes 
implicated by the federal rules. 
I. FEDERAL DEPORTATION ON THE BASIS OF STATE CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN PARDONED, EXPUNGED, SET-ASIDE, OR 
APPEALED 
A. The General Scheme 
Federal immigration law endeavors to uniformly determine which 
noncitizens convicted of crimes should be deported through category-
based labels of criminal activity.28 Lawfully present noncitizens 
become removable when their state or federal convictions and 
sentences match up with one of the INA’s many categories of 
deportable offenses.29 Although adjudicatory discretion plays some 
role in whether criminal noncitizens will ultimately be deported, that 
role is very small.30 Likewise, prosecutorial discretion at the agency 
level remains rarely exercised, despite a highly publicized campaign by 
the Department of Homeland Security under President Obama to 
 
 28 See Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact of the 1996 Deportation Laws and 
the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936, 1938-41 (2000). 
 29 The INA divides the grounds of removal from the United States into two 
categories: deportability and inadmissibility. In general, the grounds of deportability 
apply to noncitizens who are lawful permanent residents (LPRs), while the grounds of 
inadmissibility apply to noncitizens seeking lawful entry for the first time, as well as 
some LPRs who temporarily travel abroad. See infra text accompanying notes 97-99. 
 30 See infra text accompanying notes 103-04 (discussing the difficulty of obtaining 
discretionary relief at the immigration level under current law). 
  
364 University of California, Davis [Vol. 46:355 
refine enforcement priorities.31 ICE prosecutors almost never exercise 
discretion for the benefit of noncitizens with criminal records.32 
The category in which a noncitizen’s conviction falls also impacts 
eligibility for naturalization, admissibility, mandatory detention, and 
judicial review of a removal order.33 Some of the broader categories, 
such as aggravated felonies, crimes involving moral turpitude 
(“CIMT”), controlled substance convictions, and firearms convictions, 
sweep in many types of criminal offenses. Other categories are very 
specific — for example, a conviction for high-speed flight from an 
immigration checkpoint or failure to register as a sex offender. While 
in limited exceptions federal law provides that noncitizens may 
become deportable solely on the basis of an immigration judge’s 
administrative determination of criminality, the vast majority of the 
 
 31 In 2011, the general counsel of Immigration and Customs Enforcement under 
the Obama Administration issued two memorandums setting forth priorities for more 
nuanced prosecutorial discretion in deportation proceedings in light of the 
government’s limited resources and the high numbers of respondents on immigration 
court dockets. See Memorandum from John Morton, General Counsel, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to All 
Field Office Directors, All Special Agents in Charge, and All Chief Counsel 5 (June 17, 
2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/prosecutorial-
discretion-memo.pdf (outlining policy for ICE to refrain from pursuing noncitizens 
with close family, educational, military, or other ties in the U.S., instead focusing 
limited resources on persons with criminal records or who pose threats to public 
safety or national security); Memorandum from John Morton, General Counsel, U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to All ICE 
Employees 1-4 (Mar. 2, 2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/news/releases/ 
2011/110302washingtondc.pdf (outlining ICE’s enforcement priorities). Nevertheless, 
in the year following the Morton memos, ICE closed less than 1.5% of pending cases, 
and the backlog of pending matters in immigration court actually rose from 298,173 
in September 2011 to 314,417 in July 2012. See Meghan McCarthy, ‘Prosecutorial 
Discretion’ barely dents immigration case backlog, TUCSON SENTINEL (July 16, 2012), 
http://www.tucsonsentinel.com/local/report/071512_immig_cases/prosecutorial-discretion-
barely-dents-immigration-case-backlog; Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRAC 
IMMIGRATION, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2012). In part, internal agency resistance has stymied efforts to institute 
widespread and uniform application of prosecutorial discretion. Specifically, the 
National ICE Counsel — the union representing ICE agents — has refused to allow 
their members to participate in the prosecutorial discretion training. See Julia Preston, 
Agents’ Union Stalls Training on Deportation Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2012, at A15. 
 32 See Cade, supra note 12, at 13-14 (arguing that ICE rarely exercises 
prosecutorial discretion even where the noncitizen has only misdemeanor 
convictions). 
 33 See, e.g., Alina Das, The Immigration Penalties of Criminal Convictions: 
Resurrecting Categorical Analysis in Immigration Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1669, 1681-88 
(2011) (describing how the federal immigration system assesses criminal convictions). 
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INA’s category-based deportation provisions require an actual state or 
federal conviction.34 
Although either federal or state convictions can fall within the INA’s 
categories of deportable offenses, the federal government primarily 
depends on states and their criminal justice systems to determine in 
the first instance whether lawfully present immigrants are criminals 
and therefore deportable under federal law. Federal criminal 
prosecutions have grown significantly in the last forty years,35 but they 
are far eclipsed by the number of state criminal prosecutions. In the 
first eleven months of 2012, the federal government reported 154,353 
new prosecutions.36 In contrast, each of the fifty states typically has 
more than 100,000 criminal prosecutions per year, and larger states 
like New York and California have many times that amount.37 
Moreover, more than half of federal prosecutions are for illegal entry 
 
 34 A noncitizen is subject to the human trafficking deportability ground merely on 
the basis of knowledge or “reason to believe” on the part of the consular officer, 
Secretary of Homeland Security, Secretary of State, or Attorney General. See 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 237, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(F) (2008) 
(incorporating Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(2)(H), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(H)). Similarly, a noncitizen found engaging in terrorist activities or in 
conduct implicating national security grounds, or “who is, or at any time after 
admission has been, a drug abuser or addict” is deportable even in the absence of a 
conviction. See id. § 237(a)(2)(B)(ii), (a)(4)(A)-(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(ii), 
(a)(4)(A)-(B). Finally, noncitizens who were inadmissible at time of entry under 
Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(A) are deportable without a conviction. 
See id. § 237(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(A). 
 35 See JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME 
TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 56-60, 102-04, 
164-65 (2007); Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind, Introduction, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 6, 10 (2002); 
James A. Strazzella & William W. Taylor, Federalizing Crime - Examining the 
Congressional Trend to Duplicate State Laws, CRIM. JUST., Spring 1999, at 4, 7.  
 36 Prosecutions for 2012, TRACFED, http://tracfed.syr.edu/results/ 
9x2050ab974312.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2012) (noting that at this pace, the 
annual total of prosecutions will be 168,385 for fiscal year 2012). 
 37 In 2011, New York had close to 500,000 criminal prosecutions. See 2007-2011 
Disposition of Adult Arrests, New York State, NEW YORK STATE DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SERVICES, http://www.criminaljustice.ny.gov/crimnet/ojsa/dispos/nys.pdf (last visited June 
9, 2012). In California the number was over 1,000,000 in 2009. Total Law Enforcement 
Dispositions of Adult and Juvenile Arrests, 2009, CALIFORNIA DEPT. OF JUSTICE, 
http://stats.doj.ca.gov/cjsc_stats/prof09/00/5.htm (last visited June 11, 2012). See generally 
Criminal – Total Caseloads 2009, COURT STATISTICS PROJECT, STATE COURT CASELOAD 
STATISTICS, http://www.courtstatistics.org/Other-Pages/StateCourtCaseloadStatistics.aspx 
(last visited June 11, 2012) (outlining total criminal caseloads by state for 2009). 
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and reentry violations, rather than for the non-immigration crimes 
that fall within the INA’s categories of deportable offenses.38 
B. The Historical Context 
Federal laws predicating deportation on the basis of state 
convictions are almost 100 years old. The government has used 
convictions and other indicia of criminal behavior in exclusion and 
naturalization proceedings for even longer. As the following sections 
show, federal laws that imposed immigration consequences on the 
basis of convictions historically gave effect to pardons and other post-
conviction procedures. 
1. Pre-1917 Pardons in Immigration Cases 
Federal immigration control in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries looked very different than the highly regulated 
regime that we have now. The first federal exclusion act was passed in 
1875,39 but it was not until 1917 that the law provided for deportation 
on the basis of post-entry convictions.40 The early decades of the 
twentieth century saw intense congressional debate about how to 
regulate immigration effectively.41 Although much of the legislation 
proposed during that time was aimed at increasing the grounds of 
exclusion, Congress also began to consider bills to deport immigrants 
 
 38 See Prosecutions for 2012, TRAC, http://tracfed.syr.edu/results/9x2050ab974312.html 
(last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
 39 Immigration Act of 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477, 477-78. 
 40 See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 28, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889 (providing for 
deportation on the basis of crimes involving moral turpitude committed within five 
years of entry). In 1907, Congress enacted a statute providing that any noncitizen 
woman found to be a prostitute within three years of entering the United States shall 
be deported. See Immigration Act of 1907, ch. 1134, § 3, 34 Stat. 898, 900. As 
Professor Kanstroom notes, this law was part of “the long-standing attempt to prevent 
the entry of prostitutes into the United States.” See DANIEL KANSTROOM, DEPORTATION 
NATION 125 (2007). Significantly, under the 1907 law and its revision in 1910 (36 
Stat. 263), no conviction was required; the status of being a prostitute served to 
evidence the noncitizen’s unfitness for admission at the time of entry. See id. at 125-
26, n. 221; see also E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION 
POLICY, 1798-1965, 146, 167 (1981) (demonstrating that after the 1907 Act, Congress 
began to consider bills making noncitizens deportable for U.S. convictions, but did 
not pass such a law until 1917). 
 41 See generally HUTCHINSON, supra note 40, at 134-67 (providing an overview of 
congressional debate regarding United States immigration regulation from 1903 to 
1917).  
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on the basis of post-entry criminal conduct.42 This shift reflected the 
widespread public perception of a major crime wave in the early 
twentieth century, with immigrants often blamed for the perceived 
rising criminality.43 
Even before the rise of deportation on the basis of domestic 
convictions, however, the efficacy of pardons, both foreign and 
domestic, sometimes arose in exclusion and other immigration 
proceedings. An 1885 Attorney General Opinion indicated that even a 
foreign pardon, if unconditional, would overcome grounds of 
inadmissibility.44 Early cases under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of 
Immigration and Naturalization within the Department of Labor45 tend 
to show that pardons were generally understood to remove the 
immigration consequences that would follow the fact of conviction, 
just as they removed other collateral disabilities. The Bureau of 
Immigration routinely submitted letters opposing (but occasionally 
supporting) federal pardons for noncitizens convicted of smuggling or 
prostitution-related offenses.46 In re-entry cases, pardons were 
distinguished from procedures such as parole, with only the former 
sufficient to remove a charge of criminality.47 Law enforcement 
 
 42 See KANSTROOM, supra note 40, at 125-33. 
 43 See id. at 133 (noting that more than fifty major crime studies were published in 
the early twentieth century). 
 44 See Immigrant Act, 18 Op. Att’y Gen. 239, 239-240 (1885) (citing to Supreme 
Court cases and international law treatises to conclude that foreign pardon, so long as 
unconditional, makes applicant admissible for entry to the U.S.). 
 45 Early immigration case files, which were under the jurisdiction of the 
Department of Labor from 1903 to 1940 (called the Department of Commerce & 
Labor until 1913), are stored in the National Archives in Washington, D.C. 
 46 Most of these cases involved offenses under The White Slave Traffic Act of June 
25, 1910 (“The Mann Act”), 36 Stat. 825, which prohibited the importation or 
interstate transportation of women for immoral purposes. See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, SUBJECT FILE NO. 
53,145-48 (July 17, 1912) (containing Bureau of Immigration letter opposing federal 
pardon of noncitizen’s deportable prostitution-related offense under the Mann Act); 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, 
SUBJECT FILE NO. 53,344-70 (June 18, 1912) (same); DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND 
LABOR, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION, SUBJECT FILE NO. 53,138-60 
(Feb. 19 1912) (same); DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION 
AND NATURALIZATION, SUBJECT FILE NO. 53,028-17 (Aug. 30, 1911) (containing letter 
from Bureau of Immigration to Attorney General supporting noncitizen’s application 
for a pardon for smuggling charge because noncitizen supplied valuable information 
about a smuggling ring through Canada, which led to the removal of a corrupt 
immigration officer who was a key player).  
 47 See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION, SUBJECT FILE NO. 52,395-36 (June 3, 1909) (Bureau of Immigration 
memorandum denying reentry following short trip abroad to lawful permanent 
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authorities sometimes requested pardons to prevent immigration 
consequences for noncitizens who aided the prosecution of others.48 
A 1908 debate on the floor of the House of Representatives 
regarding a bill to add a ground of deportation on the basis of criminal 
convictions also provides a glancing indication that pardons in that era 
were understood to remove immigration consequences:49 
Mr. SULZER.50 Suppose a governor should pardon a man. 
Mr. BENNET.51 Then the law would not act on him. 
Mr. SULZER. He would be restored to all his rights, and hence 
could not be sent back. 
Mr. BENNET. Yes. 
Mr. SULZER. There is nothing in your bill to that effect, 
however. 
Mr. BENNET. The pardon wipes out the conviction. This law 
only acts at the expiration of his sentence. Similarly it would 
not act on a man on whom sentence was suspended.52 
Because a governor’s pardon restores a state convict “to all his rights,” 
it was understood (by Representative Bennet, at least) that the convict 
would not be deportable on the basis of the conviction. Representative 
 
resident convicted of second degree murder on basis that governor’s parole 
insufficient to overcome exclusion grounds, but noting that “[i]f the instrument were 
a full and unconditional pardon, Musso would be restored thereby to a position of 
absolute innocence”); DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION 
AND NATURALIZATION, SUBJECT FILE NO. 52,080-160 (1917) (Department of Justice 
opposition to lawful permanent resident’s request for pardon to facilitate return from 
Mexico where he fled in 1911 to avoid prosecution for smuggling charges).  
 48 See, e.g., DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND LABOR, BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND 
NATURALIZATION, SUBJECT FILE NO. 53,943-14 (Aug. 23, 1916) (Bureau of Immigration 
letter supporting Attorney General pardon for noncitizen in view of his rehabilitation 
and valuable assistance given in rounding up smugglers). 
 49 Much of the debate over the proposed deportation law concerned other matters. 
See, e.g., 42 CONG. REC. 2752 (1908) (debating, inter alia, the non-uniformity of 
felonies among the states and the potential inclusion of minor crimes).  
 50 Representative William Sulzer, a Democrat from New York, served in Congress 
from March 1895 to December 1912, and then went on to become governor of New 
York. See WILLIAM F. STEVENSON, BIOGRAPHICAL DIRECTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS 
1774-1927, H.R. DOC. NO. 783, at 1585 (1928).  
 51 Representative William Bennet, a Republican from New York, served in 
Congress from March 1905 to March 1911. From 1907 to 1910 he was a member of 
the United States Immigration Commission. See id. at 693. 
 52 42 CONG. REC. 2753 (Mar. 2, 1908). 
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Sulzer did not seem to disagree, though his comments suggest he 
thought the pardon’s nullifying effect on the conviction should be 
made explicit in the statute. 
In sum, the available evidence indicates that in the era before 
deportation on the basis of post-entry criminal conduct, processes that 
deferred or removed a conviction under state law were commonly 
given preclusive effect in immigration proceedings. 
2. Pardons and the 1917 Act 
The first significant criminal deportation bill was passed in 1917, 
over President Wilson’s veto. Section 19 of the Immigration Act of 
1917 provided that a noncitizen would be deportable for a single 
conviction for a “crime involving moral turpitude” committed within 
five years of entry, or two convictions for crimes involving moral 
turpitude committed at any time, so long as the sentence of 
imprisonment for each conviction was at least one year.53 
The 1917 Act provided that “the deportation of aliens convicted of a 
crime involving moral turpitude shall not apply to one who has been 
pardoned.”54 The statute thus contemplated pardons as a complete 
defense to both of the statutory grounds for deportation on the basis of 
criminal convictions. The Act also created a mechanism for the 
presiding state judge to weigh in on whether a criminal conviction 
should lead to removal in a particular case, a process called a Judicial 
Recommendation Against Deportation (“JRAD”), which remained in 
effect until 1990.55 
The legislative debates leading to the 1917 Act only briefly 
concerned the relevance of state pardons.56 The fleeting discussion 
that occurred does not resolve whether Congress included the pardon 
provision to ensure that those implementing the law would be sure to 
give pardons their full effect (as suggested by the debate about the 
proposed bill in 1908), or whether Congress believed the inclusion of 
 
 53 See Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 28, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889. 
 54 See id at 889-90.  
 55 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1479-80 (2010) (discussing JRADs). 
 56 53 CONG. REC. 5172 (1916) (statement of Representative James Mann) (“But 
there are cases where the pardon is properly granted. There may be many cases where 
a parole is frequently granted. Now, ought not there to be some method . . . .”); id. 
(statement of Representative John Burnett) (“If the gentleman will permit, that is 
provided for. I will call attention to it, in the proviso on page 41: That the provision of 
this section respecting the deportation of aliens convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude shall not apply to one who has been pardoned.”). 
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the pardon exemption was necessary to confer a defense to removal 
that would otherwise not exist.57 
In the decades following the 1917 Act, domestic pardons were often 
used to allay the deportation consequences of a conviction.58 In the 
1930s, for example, New York Governor Herbert Lehman granted 110 
pardons to convicted noncitizen felons who had served their prison 
terms.59 One recipient was an Italian who, attempting to reenter the 
United States from a Canadian vacation, had been denied on grounds 
that his childhood theft conviction (“to help keep his family warm”) 
in the United States was a crime involving moral turpitude before time 
of entry.60 
Throughout the early twentieth century, Congress continued to 
enact additional criminal deportation grounds, including convictions 
related to subversion,61 wartime and neutrality acts,62 false 
registration,63 and narcotics offenses.64 Notwithstanding this growth in 
deportable offenses, courts and the immigration authorities 
interpreted each new ground of criminal deportation to incorporate 
pardons as a complete defense to removal.65 As an internal policy 
 
 57 Congress occasionally legislatively “authorizes” where no explicit authorization 
is (or should be) required. For example, in the post-Civil War era Confiscation Acts 
and Tax Cases, Congress gave the President the power to pardon related offenses 
against the U.S., but as the Supreme Court later clarified, this grant was completely 
superfluous in light of the Pardon Clause. See infra Part III.C.  
 58 See, e.g., IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERV. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION 
MANUAL §§ 655.27, 655.26 n.14 (1946) (citing to BIA and Solicitor of Labor files 
concerning pardons) (on file with author); see also id. § 655.27 n.19d. 
 59 See MAE M. NGAI, IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF 
MODERN AMERICA 76, 81 (2004) (citing Deportation of Criminals, Preservation of Family 
Units, Permit Noncriminal Aliens to Legalize Their Status: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on Immigration, 74th Cong. 122 (1936)); Pardons, Commutations, and Reprieves, in 
PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR HERBERT S. LEHMAN, 1933-1942 (1935-1947), 444-52.  
 60 See NGAI, supra note 59, at 76, 81. 
 61 Immigration (Dillingham-Hardwick) Act of 1918, ch. 186, § 4, 40 Stat. 1012 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 137-3 (1950)) (repealed 1952); see IMMIGRATION & 
NATURALIZATION SERV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 58, § 655.26 n.13. 
 62 See Act of May 10, 1920, ch. 174, § 2(a), 41 Stat. 593. 
 63 See Act of June 28, 1940, ch. 439, § 35(c), 54 Stat. 675 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 
457) (repealed 1952). 
 64 See Act of Feb. 18, 1931, ch. 224, 46 Stat. 1171 (codified as amended at 8 
U.S.C. § 156(a) (1950)) (repealed 1952) (providing for the deportation of aliens 
engaged in narcotics trafficking); see also 21 U.S.C. § 175 (1922) (repealed 1952) 
(providing for deportation of aliens convicted of importing or exporting narcotics). 
 65 See G, 4 I. & N. Dec. 73, 74, 81 (B.I.A. 1950) (holding that respondent’s 
certificate of executive clemency is a pardon within the meaning of the 1917 
Immigration Act, relieving him of all consequences stemming from his convictions for 
larceny, burglary, and receiving stolen property); G, 3 I. & N. Dec. 808, 808-09, 812 
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manual for the immigration agency’s officers in effect for much of the 
twentieth century observed, a full pardon by a governor for offenses 
against the laws of that state prevented or removed all of the penalties 
and disabilities consequent upon conviction.66 
3. Pardons and the 1952 and 1956 Acts 
In 1952, Congress reworked the immigration and nationality laws 
into a new code.67 The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952, passed over 
President Truman’s veto,68 created the INA, added stricter provisions 
concerning deportation and exclusion, and changed the immigration 
quota scheme.69 
Most relevant here, the 1952 Act restructured the statutory 
provisions affecting pardons and JRADs.70 Consistent with all prior 
immigration legislation since 1917, section 241(b) of the Act clearly 
precluded deportation for any alien convicted of a crime involving 
moral turpitude if granted a JRAD or a full and unconditional pardon 
by the President or a state governor.71 But the restructured code placed 
 
(B.I.A. 1949) (holding that pardon granted by Attorney General terminates 
deportation proceedings based on respondent’s charges of assault with intent to 
murder); see, e.g., IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 
58, §§ 655.27, 655.26 n.14 (citing to BIA and Solicitor of Labor files concerning 
pardons) (on file with author).  
 66 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 58, § 655.27 
(on file with the author). 
 67 This legislation was dubiously referred to as the “Wetback Act.” See Act of Mar. 
20, 1952, Pub. L. No. 283, 66 Stat. 26 (incorporating some of the provisions of the 
Immigration Acts of 1917 and 1920, as well as legislation passed earlier in 1952 that 
had focused only on preventing illegal entry through criminal provisions); see also 
HUTCHINSON, supra note 40, at 302-10. 
 68 Truman’s veto message criticized the McCarran-Walter Act’s continuation of the 
national origins quota system, application of racial criteria (rather than a less-
discriminatory criteria based on national origin) for quota allocation, and increased 
severity in both admission and deportation provisions. See H.R. REP. NO. 82-520, at 
153-56 (1952), available at http://bulk.resource.org/gao.gov/82-414/00002063.pdf; 
HUTCHINSON, supra note 40, at 307. 
 69 See, e.g., HUTCHINSON, supra note 40, at 302-10 (describing these aspects of the 
Act in greater detail). 
 70 The 1952 Act, like its predecessors, allowed the sentencing court to make a 
recommendation against deportation to the Attorney General, at the time of 
sentencing or within thirty days thereafter. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 
Pub. L. No. 414, § 241(b), 66 Stat. 163, 208 (allowing same). 
 71 Id. See, e.g., L, 6 I. & N. Dec. 355, 356-57 (B.I.A. 1954) (observing that a 
gubernatorial pardon is not rendered conditional where granted with the words “to 
prevent deportation” and is therefore effective to preclude deportation); T, 6 I. & N. 
Dec. 214, 216 (B.I.A. 1954) (terminating deportation proceedings where respondent 
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the deportation categories for convictions related to controlled 
substances, weapons, alien registration, and prostitution in a different 
statutory provision, which did not explicitly provide an exception for 
pardoned offenses.72 
Despite these statutory changes, judicial and administrative 
decisions continued to interpret the Act to give effect to pardons and 
JRADs in certain situations outside the enumerated limitations in the 
1952 Act. Thus, in United States ex rel. De Luca v. O’Rourke,73 the 
Eighth Circuit held that JRADs granted before the statutory changes 
would continue to preclude deportation even for immigrants 
convicted of narcotics offenses.74 In another example, the Board held 
that gubernatorial pardons continued to defeat exclusion, not just 
deportation, on the basis of domestic convictions for crimes involving 
moral turpitude, over the immigration agency’s strenuous objection 
that the new structure of the statute limited the pardon’s effect to the 
specifically enumerated grounds of deportation.75 Although these 
decisions did not turn on Congress’s power to limit state pardons, they 
arguably evince reluctance to depart from the long-held recognition 
that domestic pardons, if full and unconditional, would remove the 
immigration consequences of a conviction.76 
 
was granted a full and unconditional pardon from the Acting Governor of Hawaii, 
then only a U.S. territory). 
 72 Compare Immigration and Nationality Act § 241(a)(1) (providing that any alien 
within one or more of the excludable classes at the time of entry shall be deported 
upon order of the Attorney General), with §§ 241(a)(11)-(18) (stating that 
deportation of an alien convicted of controlled substances, weapons, alien registration, 
or prostitution shall not apply if the President or a Governor grants the alien a full and 
unconditional pardon subsequent to conviction). 
 73 213 F. 2d 759 (8th Cir. 1954). 
 74 See id. at 764-65; see also Ex parte Robles-Rubio, 119 F. Supp. 610, 613-14 
(N.D. Cal. 1954) (holding that, because of the savings clause in the 1952 Immigration 
Act, the previous recommendation against deportation still applied and relieved 
petitioner from deportation).  
 75 See H, 6 I. & N. Dec. 90, 96-97 (B.I.A. 1954) (“As long as there is a full and 
unconditional pardon granted by the President or by a Governor of a State covering 
the crime which forms the ground of deportability, whether in exclusion or in 
expulsion, the immunizing feature of the pardon clause applies, and such a crime no 
longer forms a basis for deportability.”); see also S, 5 I. & N. Dec. 10, 10 (B.I.A. 1953) 
(holding that a Certificate of Restoration of Civil Rights issued in 1946 by the 
Governor of the State of Washington has the same effect as a pardon and prevents 
deportation on the basis of crime committed in the United States before the alien’s last 
entry).  
 76 See, e.g., H, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 96 (B.I.A. 1954) (finding “no sound basis in logic 
or reason to hold that this pardoning forgiveness or immunity” does not apply to the 
exclusion grounds). 
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A report by the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1955 observed such 
decisions with apparent frustration: “Contrary to this Department’s 
contention, the [Immigration Act’s pardon] section has been 
interpreted as possibly applying to the deportation of aliens convicted 
of narcotic offenses.”77 The Committee therefore proposed an 
amendment that would make the pardon provision specifically 
“inapplicable to any alien charged with being deportable under section 
241(a)(11)” — the ground of deportation for controlled substance 
offenses.78 The Narcotics Control Act of 1956 adopted this language, 
though it did not state that any other grounds of deportability would 
also be outside a pardon’s reach.79 Following that statutory 
clarification, the BIA and courts easily concluded that pardons would 
not prevent deportation for drug possession convictions.80 
C. Current Limitations on Pardons 
With that understanding of the historical context, we can now 
consider the limitations on pardons in the INA as currently 
interpreted by the agency and a few courts. The analysis is somewhat 
technical, but this level of detail is necessary to fully explain the 
consequences of these rules for noncitizens in immigration 
proceedings. 
The basic organization of the present INA dates back to the 
Immigration Act of 1990.81 That Act eliminated the explicit statutory 
restriction on pardons for drug convictions, which had been in place 
since the 1956 legislation.82 The newly structured code affirmatively 
provided that three deportation categories would not apply where the 
underlying conviction has been pardoned,83 but was silent about the 
effect of pardons for all other deportation categories. The legislative 
record of the 1990 Act does not appear to contain a discussion of 
pardons or what effect they should have in immigration proceedings, 
 
 77 COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. NO. 1997 (S. 3760) (1955).  
 78 Id. 
 79 Narcotic Control Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-728, § 301, 70 Stat. 567, 575. 
 80 See, e.g., Yuen v. INS, 406 F.2d 499, 500-02 (9th Cir. 1969); Lindner, 15 I. & 
N. Dec. 170, 171 (B.I.A. 1975); Lee, 12 I. & N. Dec. 335, 337 (B.I.A. 1967). 
 81 See generally Immigration Act of 1990, 101 Pub. L. No. 649, 104 Stat. 4978 
(showing the same basic structure as the INA). 
 82 See generally id. (repealing former Section 241(b)); Narcotic Control Act of 
1956, 70 Stat. at 575. 
 83 See Immigration Act of 1990 §§ 602(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iv), 104 Stat. at 4978 
(referring to crimes of moral turpitude, multiple criminal convictions, and aggravated 
felony convictions). 
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so it is unclear whether Congress considered the implications of the 
statute’s structure for the effect of pardons.84 
Most recently, Congress again significantly modified the INA in 
1996 with back-to-back bills adding numerous grounds of 
deportation.85 Currently, a subsection in the part of the INA setting 
out the grounds of deportation provides that four of the categories — 
crimes involving moral turpitude, multiple criminal convictions, 
aggravated felonies, and high-speed flight from an immigration 
checkpoint — will not apply “if the alien subsequent to the criminal 
conviction has been granted a full and unconditional pardon by the 
President of the United States or by the Governor of any of the several 
states.”86 Elsewhere the INA sets forth other categories of deportation, 
which, as with previous versions of the Act, do not explicitly mention 
the effect of pardons.87 
Arguably, Congress may not have considered the cumulative 
implications of many of the last minute statutory changes that were 
made on the floor and in committee riders to the two 1996 omnibus 
statutes.88 Nothing in the legislative history of either bill reveals any 
consideration of pardons.89 All the same, the Board and the few courts 
 
 84 The most relevant document is a 1981 Report by the Select Commission on 
Immigration and Refugee Policy. This document indicates that the American Bar 
Association urged Congress to eliminate the specific statutory provision making 
pardons inapplicable to narcotics convictions and to give pardons preclusive effect for 
all convictions. See IGOR I. KAVASS & BERNARD D. REAMS, JR., THE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 
1990: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF PUB. L. NO. 101-649 291 (1997) (reproducing the Final 
Report of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy, Serial No. J-97-
38, May 5, 6, and 7, 1981, available at http://ia600400.us.archive.org/31/items/ 
finalreportofsel1981unit/finalreportofsel1981unit.pdf).  
 85 See generally Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (making omnibus consolidated appropriations for the fiscal 
year ending September 30, 1997, and for other purposes); Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat 1214 (providing additional 
resources to deter terrorism, provide justice for victims, and provide for an effective 
death penalty). 
 86 Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(2)(A)(vi), 8 U.S.C. § 
1227(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2008). 
 87 See id. §§ 237(a)(2)(A)-(E), §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)-(E) . 
 88 See Nancy Morawetz, INS v. St. Cyr: The Campaign to Preserve Court Review and 
Stop Retroactive Application of Deportation Laws, in IMMIGRATION LAW STORIES 279, 282 
(David A. Martin & Peter H. Schuck eds., 2005) (describing controversial last-minute 
measures inserted into the 1996 immigration bills); Margaret H. Taylor, Demore v. 
Kim: Judicial Deference to Congressional Folly, in IMMIGRATION LAW STORIES, supra, 343, 
352-53. 
 89 See also infra Part III.C. 
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to have considered the issue interpret the current statute to give effect 
to pardons only for the specifically enumerated grounds. 
Matter of Suh90 is illustrative of the Board’s approach to the current 
statute. In that case, the BIA considered the effect of a full pardon from 
the state of Georgia for the respondent’s conviction of sexual battery of 
a minor. Although the Board found that the pardon made the 
respondent no longer removable as an aggravated felon, it held that he 
remained deportable on the ground of a conviction for a crime of 
domestic violence or child abuse.91 Sexual battery offenses, the agency 
observed, are not explicitly exempted by pardons.92 The BIA further 
noted that in 1996 Congress added domestic violence, child abuse, 
and high speed flight as new deportable offenses, but put only high 
speed flight in the list of categories giving preclusive effect to a 
pardon. Therefore, the Board concluded, there is no “‘implicit’ 
waiver . . . where the statute so clearly states which removal grounds 
may be [eliminated by a pardon].”93 
Under the Board’s interpretation, the deportation categories 
excluded from the reach of a pardon include, among others, firearms 
offenses, domestic violence offenses, and controlled substance 
offenses.94 The most significant single exclusion is the controlled 
substance category, accounting for over twenty-five percent of all 
criminal deportations in 2010.95 Under the agency’s interpretation of 
the statute, well over one-quarter of all deportations on the basis of 
 
 90 23 I. & N. Dec. 626 (B.I.A. 2003). 
 91 See id. at 626-28.  
 92 See id. at 628. 
 93 See id.; see also In re Al-Jailani, 2004 WL 1739163, at *1-2 (B.I.A. June 28, 
2004) (holding that a domestic violence conviction is not within waiver provision). 
 94 See, e.g., In re Garcia-Lopez, 2007 WL 2825112 (B.I.A. Aug. 30, 2007) (finding 
no statutory basis to conclude that a pardon waives a controlled substance ground of 
removability). 
 95 See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, 4 (2011) [hereinafter DHS IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
statistics/publications/enforcement-ar-2010.pdf. In recent years this category 
accounted for even higher percentages of removal: almost 30% in 2009 and almost 
36% in 2008. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND 
SECURITY, IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2009, 4 (2010), available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/statistics/ publications/enforcement_ar_2009.pdf; 
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, IMMIGRATION 
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2008, 4 (2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/statistics/publications/ enforcement_ar_08.pdf.  
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criminal convictions are deemed to be unpardonable for immigration 
purposes.96 
None of the INA’s separate grounds of inadmissibility mention 
pardons.97 The inadmissibility categories apply to: (1) noncitizens who 
seek to enter the United States, including certain lawful residents who 
temporarily sojourn abroad; (2) immigrants who are physically 
present in the country without being lawfully admitted following 
inspection; and (3) noncitizens eligible to adjust (upgrade) their 
status.98 The few administrative and judicial decisions to confront the 
issue have read the statute to give no effect to pardons where a ground 
of inadmissibility is charged, even where an equivalent deportation 
ground would be eliminated by the pardon.99 
In contrast, the U.S. Department of State, interpreting the same 
statute, came to a different conclusion. The State Department 
regulations governing consular processing for visa applicants abroad 
direct that applicants shall not be considered inadmissible for crimes 
 
 96 See DHS IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS: 2010, supra note 95. A more 
precise estimate is difficult because DHS’s statistics do not break down the types of 
criminal convictions leading to deportation into sufficient detail to discern how many 
would give preclusive effect to a pardon under the Board’s interpretation. 
Additionally, in some cases the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) 
prosecutors in removal proceedings have significant control through discretionary 
charging decisions to influence whether a pardon will be effective. For example, if a 
controlled substance offense is instead charged only under the drug trafficking 
aggravated felony ground, a full and unconditional pardon will be considered 
preclusive of removal. But, as I discuss below, this anomaly only heightens the 
federalism concerns raised by the scheme. See infra Part III.C. 
 97 See Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(a)(1)-(10), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(1)-
(10) (2010).  
 98 See, e.g., id. § 1255(a) (stating that a person must be admissible to the United 
States to adjust status to lawful permanent resident). 
 99 See Aguilera-Montero v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 1248, 1252 (9th Cir. 2008); 
Balogun v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 425 F.3d 1356, 1362-63 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Irabor, 
2006 WL 2008305, at *3 (B.I.A. 2006) (holding that the statutory language regarding 
pardons “does not apply to aliens charged with inadmissibility under section 212(a) of 
the Act”). Although not explicitly relied on in these decisions, there is an important 
distinction between the inadmissibility ground and deportability grounds. Unlike the 
deportation categories, which generally require a conviction, foreign-born persons 
seeking admission (or readmission in some cases) can be held inadmissible simply on 
the basis of an administrative finding of criminal conduct. See, e.g., Immigration and 
Nationality Act § 212(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (providing that inadmissibility 
grounds apply where the noncitizen admits committing the underlying acts); id. § 
212(a)(2)(C)-(D), § 1182(a)(2)(C)-(D) (providing that inadmissibility grounds apply 
where the noncitizen commits controlled substance trafficking or 
prostitution/commercialized vice ); id. § 212(a)(3), § 1182(a)(3) (providing that 
inadmissibility grounds apply where the noncitizen commits espionage or sabotage). 
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involving moral turpitude100 on the basis of a conviction that has been 
fully and unconditionally pardoned by a governor or the President.101 
Moreover, earlier Board decisions determining the effect of pardons in 
exclusion proceedings appear to be in tension with the more limiting 
construction the agency now gives to the INA.102 
Administrative and judicial decisions determining the effect of 
pardons on the noncitizen’s eligibility to seek various forms of 
discretionary relief from removal or to naturalize only complicate the 
picture. The statutory sections dealing with naturalization or with 
discretionary alternatives to deportation, such as cancellation of 
removal or voluntary departure, do not address whether pardons will 
have any effect. Nevertheless, a number of Board decisions have held 
pardons will remove the statutory bars to obtaining discretionary relief 
from removal.103 At least one federal court seems to disagree, 
concluding that pardons do not remove statutory bars for asylum relief 
such as an aggravated felony conviction.104 As for naturalization, the 
case law suggests that a pardon removes statutory bars to becoming a 
 
 100 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 101 See 22 C.F.R. §§ 40.21(a)(5), 40.22(c) (2012). 
 102 See Rahman, 16 I. & N. Dec. 579, 580 (B.I.A. 1978) (holding that reentering 
lawful residents are within the terms of President Carter’s 1977 pardons to Vietnam 
War draft resisters, which specifically included noncitizens excludable for violation of 
the Military Selective Service Act); K, 9 I. & N. Dec. 121, 125 (B.I.A. 1960) (holding 
that JRADs and pardons overcome grounds of inadmissibility where refugee seeks to 
adjust status to lawful permanent residence); H, 6 I. & N. Dec. 90, 96 (B.I.A. 1954) 
(finding “no sound basis in logic or in reason to hold that this pardoning forgiveness 
or immunity” ineffective to prevent deportation on ground of inadmissibility at time 
of entry in exclusion proceedings as well as deportation proceedings); E-V, 5 I. & N. 
Dec. 194, 196 (B.I.A. 1953) (holding that noncitizen seeking admission who has been 
pardoned cannot be excluded on the ground that he has admitted the essential 
elements of the pardoned offense). 
 103 See, e.g., Ali, 2007 WL 1126092 (B.I.A. Feb. 20, 2007) (remanding for 
consideration of discretionary relief where respondent was no longer deportable as 
aggravated felon following pardon for child molestation conviction); In re Rosales-
Lopez, 2004 WL 2374358, at *1 (B.I.A. July 26, 2004) (recognizing pardoned 
noncitizen charged as aggravated felon was eligible for discretionary voluntary 
departure); H, 7 I. & N. Dec. 249 (B.I.A. 1956) (remanding to allow respondent to 
seek discretionary relief where larceny conviction was pardoned, and respondent was 
not statutorily precluded from showing good moral character).  
 104 See Eskite v. Dist. Dir., 901 F. Supp. 530, 536-39 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying a 
petition for writ of habeas corpus where a noncitizen received a pardon subsequent to 
a BIA decision finding him ineligible to overcome the statutory bar to apply for asylum 
or other discretionary relief as an aggravated felon, on the grounds that “Congress did 
not intend to waive deportability in the cases of aliens convicted of drug-related 
offenses”). 
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citizen where the prohibitions are predicated on the fact of 
conviction,105 although many courts hold that a pardon will not 
remove the permanent good moral character bar for murder 
convictions.106 
A final nuance of the federal scheme with respect to the effect of 
pardons warrants particular scrutiny. Under the Board’s interpretation 
of the INA, certain offenses fall under more than one ground of 
removability, leading to the bizarre result that a pardon for the 
predicate offense may be simultaneously applicable and inapplicable to 
prevent deportation.107 This paradox appears to primarily be the result 
of the dramatically expanded list of aggravated felonies, many of 
which overlap with categories of offenses that show up elsewhere in 
the statute.108 For example, aggravated felonies are defined to include 
convictions for illegal trafficking in firearms109 or trafficking in 
controlled substances,110 as well as convictions for certain sexual 
offenses.111 Under the Board’s interpretation of the INA, a pardon will 
be a complete defense to deportation on the basis of a conviction 
charged as one of these aggravated felony categories. If charged under 
 
 105 See, e.g., Daddona v. United States, 170 F.2d 964 (2d Cir. 1948) (petitioner 
granted an executive pardon who had good behavior while in prison is eligible for 
naturalization); In re Sperduti, 81 F. Supp. 833, 835 (M.D. Pa. 1949) (recommending 
petitioner be admitted to citizenship where granted a pardon and showed good 
behavior); In re Balestrieri, 59 F. Supp. 181, 181-82 (N.D. Cal. 1945) (recommending 
petitioner be admitted to citizenship because pardoned by the Governor of California, 
young at the time the crime was committed, and showed subsequent good behavior). 
 106 See, e.g., In re Siacco, 184 F. Supp. 803, 805 (D. Md. 1960) (finding a murder 
conviction to be an absolute and perpetual bar to naturalization, unless pardoned 
because of improper conviction); In re De Angelis, 139 F. Supp. 779 (E.D.N.Y. 1956) 
(holding that conviction for murder precludes applicant from establishing good moral 
character notwithstanding a pardon). But see Adam Klasfeld, “No Man is Beyond 
Redemption,” Judge Says in Granting Citizenship, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (July 12, 
2011), http://www.courthousenews.com/2011/07/12/38064.htm (reporting on grant of 
naturalization by Judge Denny Chin in S.D.N.Y. to man convicted twenty-five years 
prior of first-degree manslaughter). 
 107 See ANNE MARIE GALLAGHER, PRIVATE BILLS & PARDONS IN IMMIGRATION 63-64 
(2008); DAN KESSELBRENNER & LORY ROSENBERG, IMMIGRATION LAW & CRIMES § 4.23, 4-
112 to 114 (2008); Samuel T. Morison, Presidential Pardons and Immigration Law, 6 
STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 253, 255-56 (2010). 
 108 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(43) (2006) (listing aggravated 
felonies). 
 109 Id. § 101(a)(43)(C). 
 110 Id. § 101(a)(43)(B). 
 111 “[A]ggravated felony” includes: rape or sexual abuse of a minor, child 
pornography, and transportation for the purpose of prostitution. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1101(a)(43) (2010). 
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the firearms, controlled substances, or domestic violence categories of 
deportation, however, a pardon will have no effect. 
To illustrate, recall that in Matter of Suh the government had 
charged a respondent convicted of a single sexual battery conviction 
under Georgia law with two grounds of deportability. The Board held 
that the respondent’s full pardon for the underlying state offense 
eliminated the aggravated felony basis for removal, but had no effect 
on the domestic violence deportability ground.112 The Board rejected 
the respondent’s argument that this result was irrational and upheld 
the deportation order against him.113 
Note that under this view of the statute, whether or not a pardon is 
applicable turns on the federal agency’s choice of which of several 
applicable removal grounds to list in the charging instrument it files 
with the immigration court, or on the gratuitous decision of whether 
to charge more than one independently sufficient ground, rather than 
on the nature of the underlying offense itself. Thus, the Board has 
given preclusive effect to a pardon for a child molestation conviction 
where the respondent was charged solely with deportability as an 
aggravated felon, even though he could also have been charged under 
the domestic violence provision.114 And in another case, the Board 
held that a noncitizen who received a pardon for a state drug 
trafficking offense was not deportable where ICE charged him under 
the trafficking in controlled substances aggravated felony category, 
rather than under the general controlled substances deportation 
ground.115 
The implication of the Board’s interpretation of the statute, then, is 
that in many situations, rank and file agency prosecutors have 
ultimate discretion — through formal charging decisions — to 
determine whether or not a pardon will prevent the deportation of a 
noncitizen. The scheme thus introduces great potential for 
arbitrariness with respect to whether a sovereign pardon will be given 
effect, and, as a result, whether the pardoned noncitizen will be 
deported. This risk of arbitrary agency action raises doubts about the 
soundness of the Board’s current interpretation, a subject to which I 
return later.116 But first it will be useful to learn more about how 
 
 112 Suh, 23 I. & N. Dec. 626, 627 (B.I.A. 2003). 
 113 Id. at 628. 
 114 See Ali, 2007 WL 1126092, at *1-2 (B.I.A. Feb. 20, 2007).  
 115 See Rosales-Lopez, 2004 WL 2374358, at *1 (B.I.A. July 26, 2004) (giving 
pardon preclusive effect where noncitizen was charged only under drug trafficking 
aggravated felony category rather than controlled substance category). 
 116 See infra Part III. 
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federal law, as interpreted by the Board and some courts, restricts the 
effect of other state post-conviction processes in immigration 
proceedings. 
D. Current Limitations on Deferred Adjudication, Expungements, and 
Appeals 
The government and some courts have interpreted federal law to 
limit the immigration effect of deferred adjudications, expungements, 
appeals, and other state post-conviction processes in various ways. 
These processes are similar to pardons in terms of the state interests 
they further, although they may be less closely (or at least less 
obviously) tied to the police power of the sovereign executive.117 And 
as with pardons, the federal government historically gave effect to 
these post-conviction processes. Here again the analysis must be 
somewhat technical to illustrate the fact that the restrictive rules do 
not flow from clear statutory text but rather are disputable matters of 
interpretation. 
With the 1996 passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA),118 Congress first defined the 
term “conviction” for immigration purposes. The INA states that a 
conviction is “a formal judgment of guilt . . . entered by a court or, if 
adjudication of guilt has been withheld, where – (i) a judge or jury has 
found the alien guilty or the alien has entered a plea of guilty or nolo 
contendere or has admitted sufficient facts to warrant a finding of 
guilt, and (ii) the judge has ordered some form of punishment, 
penalty, or restraint on the alien’s liberty to be imposed.”119 Courts 
and the BIA have interpreted this definition to limit the immigration 
effect of various means through which state defendants can elude or 
eradicate a conviction, both before and after sentence has been 
imposed. 
IIRIRA’s definition of conviction was actually a partial incorporation 
of how the BIA previously defined the term in a case called Matter of 
Ozkok.120 The Ozkok test held that a noncitizen is convicted for 
immigration purposes if: (1) the court finds him or her guilty; or (2) 
in cases where adjudication is withheld, the noncitizen pleads guilty, 
no contest, or admits to facts sufficient for a finding of guilt, and the 
court orders some form of punishment or restraint on liberty, and 
 
 117 See infra Part II.C. 
 118 Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
 119 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(48)(A) (2006).  
 120 19 I. & N. Dec. 546 (B.I.A. 1988).  
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failure to comply with court orders or probation would result in an 
entry of guilt against the noncitizen.121 Thus, the modified definition 
of conviction as enacted in the INA eliminated the Board’s 
requirement that for a suspended sentence or deferred adjudication to 
qualify as a conviction for immigration purposes, an adjudication of 
guilt must automatically follow from violation of the terms of 
probation or a court order.122 Under the INA’s definition, a noncitizen 
defendant who receives a deferred adjudication or pleads no contest 
may not avoid the immigration consequences that follow a conviction. 
For immigration purposes, it is only necessary that a judge order some 
form of punishment, even if suspended, and it makes no difference 
whether the state itself would recognize the resolution of the case as a 
conviction.123 This rule prevents many diversionary treatment or 
supervision programs for minor offenders from avoiding the 
immigration consequences of a conviction.124 
Less defensibly (as a matter of statutory interpretation), the INA’s 
definition has also been held to include state convictions that have 
been vacated or set-aside under a wide variety of state processes if the 
post-conviction relief is to reward rehabilitation, or for other purposes 
not going to the merits of the underlying conviction.125 Although 
occasional federal and administrative decisions since the 1950s 
determined that certain record-altering state criminal processes did 
not eliminate deportability, these decisions were highly fact-specific.126 
As a general matter, federal courts and the Board have long held that 
 
 121 See id. at 551-52.  
 122 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 223-24 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). 
 123 See, e.g., Matter of Punu, 22 I. & N. Dec. 224, 226-29 (B.I.A. 1998) (finding 
congressional intent to treat deferred adjudications as convictions for immigration 
purposes “regardless of specific procedures in States”). 
 124 See e.g., COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE OPERATIONS, NEW YORK CITY BAR, THE 
IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF DEFERRED ADJUDICATION PROGRAMS IN NEW YORK CITY 
(June 2007) (explaining that because diversionary programs in New York require an 
upfront guilty plea, immigration consequences will attach even if the plea is later 
vacated and sentence never entered upon the defendants’ completion of the program). 
 125 See Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (B.I.A. 2003) (holding that only 
convictions quashed or vacated on grounds of “procedural or substantive defects in 
underlying proceedings” will be eliminated for immigration purposes), rev’d on other 
grounds, Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006). 
 126 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Piperkoff v. Esperdy, 267 F.2d 72 (2d. Cir. 1959) 
(holding that coram nobis motion twenty-two years after the defendant’s original 
sentencing with the purpose of issuing a JRAD is not valid because Congress intended 
JRADs to be issued within thirty days of sentence); A-F-, 8 I. & N. Dec. 429, 446 
(B.I.A. 1959) (inferring Congressional intent to recognize expungements for drug 
offenses only where the state procedure raises doubt about the validity of the 
underlying proceeding).  
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vacaturs, expungements, and similar post-conviction procedures 
remove the immigration consequences that follow conviction.127 For 
example, courts interpreted the Board’s definition of conviction in 
Ozkok not to include convictions that had been expunged, except in 
the case of drug offenses.128 
Following IIRIRA, however, a majority of the BIA sitting en banc in 
Matter of Roldan concluded that Congress had intended to implement 
a uniform approach to convictions for immigration purposes that 
focused on the initial finding of guilt, obviating any distinction 
between states “where rehabilitation is achieved through the 
expungement of records . . . rather than in a state where the procedure 
achieves the same objective simply through deferral of judgment.”129 
Accordingly, the Board held, expungements or similar procedures 
pursuant to state rehabilitative statutes do not remove the immigration 
consequences of convictions.130 
A few years later, the BIA allowed in Matter of Pickering that post-
conviction relief addressing a substantive or procedural defect in the 
underlying proceedings would continue to eliminate convictions for 
immigration purposes.131 But the many subsequent administrative and 
 
 127 The rule that convictions set aside or expunged under state law have not 
achieved sufficient finality for purposes of deportation dates back to administrative 
case law from the 1940s and 1950s. See generally Andrew Moore, Criminal 
Deportation, Post-Conviction Relief and the Lost Cause of Uniformity, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 665, 679-86 (2008) (tracing the history of the administrative and federal case law 
parsing the effectiveness of post-conviction procedures in removing immigration 
consequences). 
 128 See, e.g., Yanez-Popp v. INS, 998 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1993) (“We agree with 
the Board that narcotic offenders must be dealt with seriously and uniformly and 
unless a conviction is vacated on its merits, a revoked state conviction is still a 
“conviction” for federal immigration purposes.”). 
 129 Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 521 (B.I.A. 1999), rev’d on other grounds, 
Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding on equal protection 
grounds that expungement of first time drug offenses under state law should be given 
preclusive effect where the offender would meet the requirements of the Federal First 
Offender Act (FFOA)), overruled by Nunez-Reyes v. Holder, 646 F.3d 684 (9th Cir. 
2011) (holding that equal protection does not require expunged state convictions to 
be treated the same as federal drug convictions expunged under FFOA).  
 130 See 22 I. & N. Dec. at 512. The Roldan majority cited to a “Joint Explanatory 
Statement” in the congressional record, but that document only “clarifies 
congressional intent that even in cases where adjudication is ‘deferred,’ the original 
finding or confession of guilt is sufficient to establish a ‘conviction’ for the purposes of 
the immigration laws.” Id. at 531 (quoting and citing H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 223-24 
(1996) (Conf. Rep.)). 
 131 See Pickering, 23 I. & N. Dec. 621, 624 (B.I.A. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 
Pickering v. Gonzales, 465 F.3d 263 (6th Cir. 2006); Rodriguez-Ruiz, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
1378, 1379-80 (B.I.A. 2000). 
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federal decisions attempting to elaborate whether post-conviction 
relief is in fact on the merits, and thus valid for immigration purposes, 
have produced a complex and inconsistent doctrine.132 For example, 
courts widely diverge on critical applications of the Pickering rule, 
such as which party has the burden of showing that post-conviction 
relief was not for rehabilitative purposes, and whether it is appropriate 
for the agency to question the motives of the state court that vacated 
the judgment.133 As a result, the immigration consequences of similar 
state procedures vary widely across jurisdictions.134 
Finally, the Office of Immigration Litigation — the branch of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) that litigates immigration appeals in 
federal court — argues that under the INA’s definition of conviction, 
noncitizens may be deported while their convictions are still pending 
on direct appeal.135 Although there does not appear to be any 
indication in the legislative history that Congress was thinking about 
the effect of direct appeals on deportation when it enacted IIRIRA,136 a 
few federal courts have agreed with the DOJ’s position.137 
Here too the historical context will help demonstrate how radical 
this interpretation is. In Pino v. Landon, a 1955 per curiam decision, 
the Supreme Court held that a conviction is not sufficient for 
deportation until it is “final.”138 While Pino itself did not involve an 
appeal, subsequent circuit courts were unanimous in holding that 
convictions had not achieved sufficient finality under Pino until direct 
appellate review had been completed or waived.139 The BIA never 
questioned this finality rule. In Matter of Ozkok, for example, the 
Board observed, “[i]t is well established that a conviction does not 
attain a sufficient degree of finality for immigration purposes until 
 
 132 See MARY E. KRAMER, IMMIGRATION CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL ACTIVITY 85-97 
(4th ed. 2009). 
 133 See id. 
 134 See Moore, supra note 127, at 686-91. 
 135 See Respondent’s Answer to Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 6-7, Planes v. 
Holder, No. 07-70730 (9th Cir. Oct. 21, 2011). 
 136 See Ashwin Gokhale, Finality of Conviction, the Right to Appeal, and Deportation 
Under Montenegro v. Ashcroft: The Case of the Dog that Did Not Bark, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 
241, 270-74 (2005). 
 137 See Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011); Waugh v. Holder, 642 
F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011); Montenegro v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 1035, 1037 (7th 
Cir. 2004); see also Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1009 (5th Cir. 1999) (concluding in 
dicta that IIRIRA abrogated the finality rule). 
 138 349 U.S. 901, 901 (1955). 
 139 See Gokhale, supra note 136, at 246 n.35 (collecting cases). 
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direct appellate review of the conviction has been exhausted or 
waived.”140 
Nevertheless, in Montenegro v. Ashcroft, the Seventh Circuit held 
that the immigration statute as amended in 1996 “treats an alien as 
‘convicted’ once a court enters a formal judgment of guilt.”141 IIRIRA, 
the court concluded, “eliminated the finality requirement for a 
conviction[] set forth in Pino . . . .”142 The federal courts have split on 
this issue. While at least two other circuits also have squarely found 
that IIRIRA abrogated the finality rule,143 others have held that a 
conviction is not sufficiently final for immigration purposes while 
pending on appeal.144 Although the BIA has not taken a definitive 
position, a recent en banc decision reveals that the Board members are 
divided on whether the INA’s definition of conviction should be 
interpreted to upset the long-standing finality rule.145 
E. Summary of the Restrictions 
As this Part has shown, the federal government continues to 
increase its use of state convictions for purposes of deporting 
noncitizens. At the same time, the Board, DOJ, and courts have 
interpreted the current Act to restrict the efficacy for deportation 
purposes of the back-end processes in the states’ criminal justice 
systems. But because these restrictions are based on constructions of 
the INA, rather than on unequivocal statutory text, the rules are in 
some disarray. 
To summarize, the BIA has construed the INA to give effect to 
pardons for some deportation categories but not others, and to have 
no effect on grounds of inadmissibility. The State Department, on the 
other hand, interpreting the same statute, has concluded that a 
domestic pardon will overcome inadmissibility (at least for crimes 
involving moral turpitude). Meanwhile, administrative and judicial 
 
 140 Matter of Ozkok, 19 I. & N. Dec. 546, 552 n.7 (B.I.A. 1988). 
 141 Montenegro, 355 F.3d at 1037. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See Planes v. Holder, 652 F.3d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 2011); Waugh v. Holder, 642 
F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2011); see also Moosa v. INS, 171 F.3d 994, 1009 (5th Cir. 
1999) (concluding in dicta that IIRIRA abrogated the Pino finality rule).  
 144 See Paredes v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 528 F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding 
that “[a] conviction does not attain a sufficient degree of finality until direct appellate 
review of the conviction has been exhausted or waived”); United States v. Garcia-
Echaverria, 374 F.3d 440, 446 (6th Cir. 2004) (“To support an order of deportation, a 
conviction must be final.”). 
 145 See Cardenas Abreu, 24 I. & N. Dec. 795, 798, 802, 813-15 (B.I.A. 2009). 
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conclusions about whether pardons will remove the immigration 
consequences that follow convictions for purposes of naturalization or 
discretionary relief from removal are not uniform. 
Similarly, the BIA and many courts have interpreted the INA’s 
definition of conviction to include expungements if granted for 
rehabilitative or immigration purposes, though the text of the statute 
says nothing about the effect of such procedures. Courts diverge on 
the application of this rule in crucial ways, such as which party has the 
burden of proof and whether immigration courts should second-guess 
the state court’s motives. Finally, some federal courts of appeals have 
held, as the DOJ argues, that a conviction has achieved sufficient 
finality for deportation even where pending on direct appeal. Other 
federal courts disagree, and how the Board will rule is uncertain. 
The picture that emerges from all this is hardly one of statutory 
clarity or uniform national policy. To the contrary, even if one were to 
consider nothing more than how the rules are interpreted by federal 
agencies and courts, it is apparent that the location where the 
immigration proceedings take place will often make a crucial 
difference to the immigration effect of the various state criminal 
processes. As the next Part shows, the prevailing interpretation of the 
INA has significant consequences for regulatory autonomy in an area 
of traditional state authority. Part III will then connect the significance 
of pardons and other post-conviction procedures in state governance 
to the lack of clear textual intent to limit these processes. 
II. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES FOR STATE AUTONOMY 
Federal rules that use state convictions to establish deportability 
while ignoring or limiting the effect of pardons and other post-
conviction processes have serious implications for state authority in an 
area of traditional dominion. Although it is beyond the scope of this 
paper to attempt to demonstrate with precision the impact of the 
federal scheme, even at first blush the consequences for the 
functioning of state systems and on state autonomy are not trivial. 
Post-conviction processes implement state interests in criminal justice 
and other areas of governance well within the police powers reserved 
to the states when the Constitution was ratified. The pardon, in 
particular, was considered integral to the sovereign’s power to punish 
at the time of the framing. 
  
386 University of California, Davis [Vol. 46:355 
A. The Power to Punish and Pardon as Constitutionally Reserved State 
Police Power 
The historical sovereignty of states regarding their own criminal 
laws is in little dispute. In brief, at the nation’s founding, many 
representatives were very concerned with retaining dominion over 
matters within state jurisdiction and preventing central consolidation 
of power. At the Constitutional Convention, a proposed federal veto 
power over state authority was rejected, and there was considerable 
doubt that at least nine of the thirteen states would ratify the 
Constitution.146 Consensus developed among the Framers that the 
national government’s authority would be limited and that each state 
would retain primary regulatory authority over residents within its 
borders.147 
The Constitution achieved this limited central government with 
both finite enumerations of power and express prohibitions such as 
section 9 of Article I and (later) the Bill of Rights.148 The states 
retained residual sovereignty to administer criminal and civil justice, 
to tax residents, and to legislate regarding internal polity, all of which 
have been called the “police power.”149 There is general consensus that 
the Tenth Amendment codified the reserved police powers by 
explicitly recognizing the states’ retention of nondelegated powers,150 
 
 146 See JOSEPH ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION 102-26 (2007). 
 147 James Madison for instance, one of the era’s leading proponents of centralized 
authority, wrote in the Federalist that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed 
Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to 
remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 
45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see also ELLIS, supra note 146, 
at 102-26; Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1451 
(1987); Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 326 (1997). 
 148 See Amar, supra note 147, at 1440. 
 149 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO.17 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining that the 
“ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice” belongs “to the province of 
State governments”); Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Duane (Sept. 3, 1780), 
in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 28 (Frisch ed., 1985) 
(“The confederation in my opinion should give Congress complete sovereignty; except 
as to that part of internal police, which relates to the rights of property and life among 
individuals and to raising money by internal taxes.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 74 
(Alexander Hamilton); see generally Santiago Legarre, The Historical Background of the 
Police Power, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 745, 747-48, 771-94 (2007) (tracing the antecedents 
of state police powers to the political theory and practice from England and Europe 
that strongly influenced the development of government in America’s early years). 
 150 See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 89 (1985) (explaining that with matters of 
criminal justice, each state’s power to prosecute derives from its inherent sovereignty, 
as given to it (or as recognized) by the Tenth Amendment, rather than from the 
federal government); Legarre, supra note 149, at 778-80. 
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and some scholars have identified further textual restraints on federal 
interference with state autonomy.151 
State sovereignty over criminal law was of special concern to the 
Framers. At the New York Ratifying Convention, for example, 
Alexander Hamilton, perhaps the most fervently nationalist of the 
founders, conceded the distinct spheres the federal and state 
governments would control: 
But the laws of Congress are restricted to a certain sphere, and 
when they depart from this sphere, they are no longer supreme 
or binding. In the same manner the states have certain 
independent powers, in which their laws are supreme: For 
example, in making and executing laws concerning the 
punishment of certain crimes, such as murder, theft &c. the states 
cannot be controlled.152 
Yet national power expanded. Consolidation was perhaps inevitable, 
however far beyond the Framers’ anticipations.153 But even as the 
federal government has used the Commerce Clause to increase its role 
in criminal prosecutions and other historically local areas of 
regulation,154 state control over the administration of criminal law 
within sovereign borders has persevered.155 
In United States v. Lopez, the Court took the opportunity to remind 
Congress that “in areas such as criminal law enforcement . . . States 
historically have been sovereign,” striking down the Gun-Free School 
 
 151 See, e.g., Deborah Merritt, The Guaranty Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism 
for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 33-36, 69 (1988) (finding evidence in the 
ratification debates that Article IV’s “Guarantee Clause” was intended not just as a 
limit on state power, but also as a “modest restraint” against federal interference with 
state autonomy). 
 152 Alexander Hamilton, Speech in the N.Y. Ratifying Convention (June 28, 1788), 
in SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 149, at 238 
(emphasis added). 
 153 See, e.g., DAVID SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 113 (1995) (describing how 
the scope of federal government has necessarily expanded); Friedman, supra note 147, 
at 366-78 (describing the historical, technological, and economic forces leading to 
centralization of power). 
 154 See, e.g., William W. Schwarzer & Russell R. Wheeler, On the Federalization of 
the Administration of Civil and Criminal Justice, 23 STETSON L. REV. 651, 664 (1994) 
(saying that “few subjects within the traditional scope of state concerns remain 
beyond the authority of Congress to regulate”); James Strazella, The Federalization of 
Criminal Law, 1998 ABA SEC. CRIM. JUSTICE REP. 5, 7 (1998) (describing how the 
federal government has expanded its use of the Commerce Clause).  
 155 See SIMON, supra note 35, at 21 (“Perhaps more than any other form of public 
law, criminal law is associated with sovereignty . . . .”). 
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Zones Act on the grounds that gun possession near schools is a matter 
for states and localities rather than the federal government.156 Five 
years later, the Court reiterated that there was “no better example of 
the police power, which the Founders denied the National 
Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression of violent 
crime and vindication of victims.”157 Despite more recent 
jurisprudence signaling that the policing of the federal government’s 
reach under its Commerce Clause authority might have run its 
course,158 the Court has never backed away from the principle, 
embodied in the constitutional structure, that states retain dominion 
over their criminal laws. 
The pardon, like other clemency powers, is rooted in a sovereign’s 
inherent authority to govern its own affairs, especially through 
punishment and forgiveness.159 Pardons have been used in this 
country from the time of the colonies as a component of criminal 
justice and to promote social cohesion by encouraging rehabilitation 
and removing the collateral consequences that follow conviction.160 
Today each of the fifty states constitutionally provides for the exercise 
of pardons and other forms of clemency,161 and the Supreme Court has 
held that a state’s use of the pardon power is virtually unreviewable.162 
There is little doubt that clemency powers were understood to fall 
within the sovereignty and self-governance that were reserved to the 
 
 156 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995). 
 157 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000). 
 158 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 7-9 (2005) (upholding congressional power 
under the Commerce Clause to criminalize possession of marijuana under federal law 
as part of a comprehensive statute addressing narcotics trafficking, even in a state that 
allowed marijuana for medical use).  
 159 See MOORE, supra note 16, at 15; Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Congressional Power and 
State Court Jurisdiction, 94 GEO. L.J. 949, 984-85, 999 (2006); Daniel Kobil, The 
Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power From the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 
569, 572-73 (1991) [hereinafter Quality of Mercy]. 
 160 CHRISTEN JENSEN, THE PARDONING POWER IN THE AMERICAN STATES 4-7 (1922) 
(discussing pardon powers in the colonial governments of Virginia, New England, 
Massachusetts, Maine (which belonged to Massachusetts), Maryland, Connecticut, 
Rhode Island, the Carolinas, New York, New Jersey, New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, 
Delaware, and Georgia); see also Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12 (1993) 
(“Clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and is the 
historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial process has been 
exhausted.”); William F. Duker, The President’s Power to Pardon: A Constitutional 
History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475, 497-501 (1977). 
 161 Kathleen Ridolfi & Seth Gordon, Gubernatorial Clemency Powers: Justice or 
Mercy?, 24 A.B.A. CRIM. JUST. 26, 31 (2009); Margaret Colgate Love, Relief, supra note 7.  
 162 Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 280 (1998). 
  
2012] Deporting the Pardoned 389 
states when the national government was created.163 Anthony Bellia 
has demonstrated that a fundamental precept of the law of nations 
during this country’s early history was that the sovereign’s power to 
pardon was inseparable from the power to punish.164 Alexander 
Hamilton, Joseph Story, and other prominent participants at the 
Federal Convention of 1787 and in the ratification debates certainly 
held this view.165 Indeed, James Madison’s notes from the Federal 
Convention show that he believed it would take a measure of 
constitutional proportion to legitimately divest states of the power to 
pardon any crimes prosecuted in state courts, including federal 
crimes.166 Ultimately, the importance that the national government’s 
founders placed on executive clemency is evident in their decision to 
allocate nearly unfettered authority to pardon federal offenses to the 
President, which the Supreme Court has interpreted to be limited only 
by a few other textual commitments in the Constitution.167 Other post-
conviction processes that defer, alter, or revoke the continuing validity 
of the conviction, while not historically tied to sovereignty, also 
comprise indispensable tools of modern criminal justice and 
governance more generally. As interpreted, current immigration rules 
affect these processes in numerous ways, imposing externalities and 
costs in an area constitutionally reserved to states. 
 
 163 Hamilton observed that in New York, for example, the governor’s power to 
pardon perhaps extended even further than would the proposed national 
Constitution, at that time reaching even cases involving impeachment (though not 
including treason or murder). Yet, there was never an implication that states could not 
define their pardon power as they saw fit. THE FEDERALIST NO. 69 (Alexander 
Hamilton).  
 164 Bellia, supra note 159, at 984-88; see also W.H. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER 
OF THE PRESIDENT 14-20 (1941); Duker, supra note 160, at 501-06. 
 165 See Bellia, supra note 159, at 984-88. 
 166 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 317 (James Madison) (Max Farrand ed., 
1966) (“[I]n most if not all of the States, the Executives have by their respective 
Constitutions the right of pard[oning]. How could this be taken away from them by a 
legislative ratification only?”). Madison’s concern, as Professor Bellia explains, arose 
from William Paterson’s “New Jersey Plan” at the Convention, which called for state 
courts to adjudicate federal penal actions. Madison believed that something more than 
ratification of such a plan by state legislatures would be sufficient to legitimately 
remove the pardon power of state executives. Bellia, supra note 159, at 986. 
 167 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (conferring on the President “[p]ower to grant 
Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States”). For a thorough 
discussion of the textual limits on the President’s pardon power, see Morison, supra 
note 107, at 278-88. 
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Federalism is often defined in terms of the values that it serves.168 
Writing for the majority in Gregory v. Ashcroft,169 for example, Justice 
O’Connor emphasized the instrumental nature of federalism: 
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the 
people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized 
government that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of 
a heterogeneous society; it increases opportunity for citizen 
involvement in democratic processes; it allows for more 
innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes 
government more responsive by putting the States in 
competition for a mobile citizenry.170 
Thus, as the Court and federalism scholars have observed, a healthy 
federalism protects individual liberty,171 enhances political 
accountability,172 allows states to be laboratories of innovation,173 and 
preserves room for cultural diversity.174 In particular the Court has 
scrutinized federal legislation that disproportionately burdens some 
states or localities, especially with respect to their traditional authority 
 
 168 See SHAPIRO, supra note 153, at 76-106; Michael C. Dorf, Instrumental and Non-
Instrumental Federalism, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 825, 828 (1997); Friedman, supra note 147, 
at 386-405; Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491-1511 (1987); Trevor W. Morrison, The State Attorney General 
and Preemption, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S 
CORE QUESTION 81, 83 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009). There are, of course, many 
varieties of federalism discourse and just as many critiques. My references to the 
values of federalism are necessarily a stylized account of the doctrine. 
 169 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 170 Id. at 458. 
 171 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(arguing that the federalist structure is vital to securing freedom); Friedman, supra 
note 147, at 402-05 (arguing that throughout history, states have served as political 
form for expressing popular sentiment, sometimes regrettably as with opposition to 
school desegregation, and sometimes positively as with opposition to the Alien and 
Sedition Acts). 
 172 Friedman, supra note 147, at 395 (explaining that political accountability 
encompasses not just electoral accountability but moral approval and ease of access). 
 173 SHAPIRO, supra note 153, at 87-88; Friedman, supra note 147, at 397-98 
(arguing that the value of states as laboratories of experimentation is best defended as 
the benefits of seeing what works when states by necessity innovate in individual ways 
to address pressing problems). 
 174 Friedman, supra note 147, at 401-02 (arguing that federalism “enhances our 
lives by preserving and creating diversity”); A.E. Dick Howard, Garcia and the Values 
of Federalism: On the Need for a Recurrence to Fundamental Principles, 19 GA. L. REV. 
789, 795 (1985) (arguing that “federalism both reflects and encourages pluralism, 
allowing individual idiosyncrasies to flourish”); Merritt, supra note 151, at 8 (arguing 
that the federalist balance contributes to diversity). 
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over criminal law.175 As the following sections show, the immigration 
rules for pardons and other post-conviction processes have practical 
and political consequences for states that implicate many of these 
federalism values. 
B. Systemic Legitimacy 
Pardons have long been recognized as integral to maintaining the 
legitimacy of the criminal justice system through error correction and 
individuation in punishment. In the Supreme Court’s words, pardons 
and other clemency powers “exist[] to afford relief from undue 
harshness or evident mistake in the operation or enforcement of the 
criminal law.”176 The constitutional Framers considered clemency to 
be a “fail-safe” for justice.177 In the nineteenth century, state courts 
often explicitly recognized the error correcting functions of pardons 
and the responsibility of the sovereign to ensure just convictions 
under state law.178 At common law, judges could not order new trials 
following felony convictions, leaving the pardon as the only means of 
redress where the verdict was not supported by the evidence.179 
Pardons also were often necessary to secure the testimony of witnesses 
 
 175 In United States v. Lopez, for example, Justice Kennedy’s opinion criticized the 
“territorial operation” of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, which he observed would 
distort the daily activities in some localities while having no impact on others. 514 
U.S. at 581-83.  
 176 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925). 
 177 JEFFREY CROUCH, THE PRESIDENTIAL PARDON POWER 11 (2009). 
 178 See, e.g., In re Flournoy, 1 Ga. 606, 607 (1846) (“[The pardon] power is given 
to the executive to relieve against the possible contingency, under all systems of laws, 
of a wrongful conviction.”); State v. Alexander, 76 N.C. 231, 234 (1877) (“There are 
cases where he has been improperly convicted and asks not for mercy but for 
justice.”); Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 377, 381 (1883) (concluding that a pardon 
“is, in effect, a reversal of the judgment, a verdict of acquittal, and a judgment of 
discharge thereon”). 
 179 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass. 515, 534 (1822) (noting that, 
under English common law, one convicted of a capital felony in a trial where an 
“irregularity” occurred could obtain redress only through a royal pardon); People v. 
Comstock, 8 Wend. 549, 549 (N.Y. 1832) (ruling that judge has no power to grant 
new trial following felony conviction); Ball v. Commonwealth, 35 Va. 726, 727-28 
(1837) (holding that judge has power to grant a new trial after conviction where 
evidence is “utterly insufficient” to support the verdict, but acknowledging this 
holding is a departure from the common law rule recognized by the trial court that 
generally only a pardon could redress this injustice in felony cases); King v. Oxford, 
13 East 411, 416, n.b (1811); King v. Mawbrey, 6 T.R. 619, 625 (1796). 
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or codefendants in criminal prosecutions, which, while not exactly 
error correction, may still be conceptualized as justice enhancing.180 
Though pardons are less frequently granted in recent years, it is not 
hard to find contemporary examples of the use of clemency powers to 
remedy defects or calibrate punishment. Governor Paterson exercised 
the justice-correcting function of pardons in at least one noncitizen’s 
case in 2010. At age fifteen, lawful permanent resident Marlon Powell 
used a fake ID to gain admission to a club, where he was arrested for 
misdemeanor drug possession.181 He was then convicted in the adult 
criminal system and sentenced to nine months in jail, apparently 
under the mistaken belief that he was at that time twenty-one years 
old.182 Had Powell been adjudicated a Youthful Offender, his 
misdemeanor conviction would not have been a deportable offense.183 
Based on this error (and Powell’s apparent rehabilitation), Paterson 
granted him a pardon.184 
Former Illinois Governor George Ryan pardoned four death row 
inmates whom he believed to be innocent,185 and then, showing that 
clemency can be used to ensure justice on a wider-scale, commuted 
the sentences of 167 convicts on death row to life without parole in 
light of strong evidence the state system was leading to wrongful 
convictions.186 In another recent example, Governor Tim Kaine of 
Virginia issued an absolute pardon in 2007 to a death row inmate 
exonerated by DNA evidence following a wrongful conviction for 
 
 180 See, e.g., Watson v. State, 90 Tex. Crim. 576, 579 (Tex. Crim. App. 1922) 
(noting that the accomplice, Charley Chambers, testified against defendant in 
exchange for a pardon by the Governor of Texas). This function of the pardon, of 
course, has less use today because prosecutors can offer immunity from prosecution. 
 181 See Press Release, Governor of New York State, Governor Paterson Announces 
Pardons (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.governor.ny.gov/archive/paterson/ 
press/120610Pardons.html. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362, 1366 (B.I.A. 2000) (holding that an 
adjudication under New York Criminal Procedure Law Article 720 youthful offender 
procedures is not a conviction for immigration purposes). 
 184 As the Board has construed the INA, however, Paterson’s pardon will not 
remove the immigration consequences of a drug conviction. Resentencing would have 
been far more effective, but apparently the problem was that Powell had already been 
ordered removed by the time of the pardon. See Governor Paterson Announces 
Pardons, supra note 5. I discuss Paterson’s pardon of Powell further in Part III. 
 185 Jodi Wilgoren, 4 Death Row Inmates Pardoned, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2003), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/01/11/us/4-death-row-inmates-are-pardoned.html. 
 186 Governor Ryan defended the clemency as an act of justice, not mercy, in light of 
a three-year study finding that more convicts on death row had been exonerated than 
executed in the state since 1977. Ridolfi & Gordon, supra note 161, at 26. 
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capital murder and rape.187 Indeed, there have been 297 post-
conviction DNA exonerations in the United States to date, many of 
which were followed by pardons.188 Frequently governors are asked to 
grant reprieves (a related clemency power) to delay execution where 
new evidence or a new basis for appeal comes to light.189 
As these examples show, pardons and other clemency powers are 
integral, if judiciously exercised, components of justice and calibrated 
punishment in the state system. To a large extent, of course, other 
state procedures now play a significant role in systemic integrity. 
Direct appellate review of trial court convictions, for instance, serves 
to maintain the legitimacy of state power, correct trial court errors, 
and assure uniform application of the criminal law within the state.190 
Nearly every state guarantees defendants both the right of appeal191 
and the effective assistance of appellate counsel.192 While a 
“substantial percentage” of state convictions are reversed on appeal,193 
the appellate process serves as more than just a check on the legality 
of a conviction. A healthy appeals system also helps maintain 
confidence in the fairness and legitimacy of the criminal justice 
system, which in many states is undergoing tremendous resource 
strain at the trial level.194 Public defender offices too have very high 
caseloads nationwide, raising the specter of compromised 
 
 187 Maria Glod, Former Death-Row Inmate Officially Declared Innocent, WASH. POST 
(July 7, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/07/06/ 
AR2007070602051.html. 
 188 See Facts on Post-Conviction DNA Exonerations, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Facts_on_PostConviction_DNA_Exoneratio
ns.php (last visited Aug. 26, 2012). 
 189 See Kobil, Quality of Mercy, supra note 159, at 578 (discussing reprieves as a 
clemency power). 
 190 See, e.g., Gokhale, supra note 136, at 264, nn.152-53 (pointing to an “enduring 
consensus” among state legislatures that the right of direct appeal is essential to the 
foundation of criminal law and legitimacy of the criminal justice system). 
 191 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 
1998 173-75 (2000). 
 192 See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (holding that the defendant 
has a constitutional right to counsel where there is an appeal as of right); Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (holding that a rule denying adequate appellate review 
is indistinguishable from a rule that denies the right to defend oneself in trial court). 
 193 Gokhale, supra note 136, at 271; Jon O. Newman, A Study of Appellate Reversals, 
58 BROOK. L. REV. 629, 633 (1992).  
 194 See Written Testimony of Attorney General Eric Holder to Senate Judiciary 
Committee, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Nov. 18, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ag/ 
testimony/2009/ag-testimony-0911181.html (discussing the funding and oversight 
issues contributing to the indigent defense “crisis” throughout the nation). 
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representation.195 Frequently, indigent defendants proceed without 
counsel at all.196 These pressures not only increase the importance of 
the appellate process in maintaining the legitimacy of the system at 
both individual and societal levels, but also suggest clemency powers 
such as pardons remain vital. 
C. Rehabilitation, Community Impact, and Membership 
Sovereigns govern through post-conviction processes in other ways 
too. Pardons promote community welfare by encouraging reformation 
and by removing the crippling disabilities that attach to convictions 
and frequently affect more than just the offender. States have long 
recognized that where “properly granted,” a merciful pardon is “wise 
public policy,”197 and every state has long used clemency “for merciful 
and beneficent purposes.”198 Throughout this country’s history, such 
purposes have included rewarding rehabilitation, promoting good 
behavior in prisons, and determining that the offender (or the 
 
 195 See, e.g., Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-Counsel 
Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967 (2012) (outlining the high 
caseloads public defenders face); Kaitlin C. Gratton, Note, Desperate Times Call for 
Desperate Measures: Reclassifying Drug Possession Offenses in Response to the Indigent 
Defense Crisis, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1039, 1045-55 (2012). 
 196 See generally Robert C. Boruchowitz, Malia N. Brink, & Maureen Dimino, Minor 
Crimes, Massive Waste: The Terrible Toll of America’s Broken Misdemeanor Courts, 2009 
NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIM. DEF. LAW. 10, 14-17 (discussing absence of counsel as a serious 
problem in misdemeanor courts); GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S CONTINUING 
QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID 
AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, 22-26 (2004) (discussing current problems with indigent 
representation in criminal proceedings). 
 197 Knapp v. Thomas, 39 Ohio St. 377, 381 (1883) (“Though sometimes called an 
act of grace and mercy, a pardon, where properly granted, is also an act of justice, 
supported by a wise public policy.”). 
 198 Sterling v. Drake, 29 Ohio St. 457, 465 (1876); see, e.g., Baldwin v. Scoggin, 15 
Ark. 427, 431 (1855) (stating that most governments consider it wise to include 
pardoning power somewhere in government); State ex rel. Daniel v. Rose, 29 La. Ann. 
755, 760 (1877) (explaining Louisiana’s pardoning power); State v. Baptiste, 26 La. 
Ann. 134, 136-37 (1874) (explaining rationale behind Louisiana’s pardoning power); 
Rich v. Chamberlain, 104 Mich. 436, 441 (1895) (explaining Michigan’s pardoning 
power); Jones v. Board, 56 Miss. 766, 770 (1879) (explaining Mississippi’s pardoning 
power); State v. Foley, 15 Nev. 64, 69 (1880) (explaining Nevada’s pardoning power); 
State v. Bowman, 145 N.C. 452, 454 (1907) (explaining North Carolina’s pardoning 
power); Knapp, 39 Ohio St. at 381 (explaining North Carolina’s pardoning power); 
Wood v. Fitzgerald, 3 Or. 568, 574 (1870) (explaining prevalence and rationale 
behind pardoning power); Diehl v. Rodgers, 169 Pa. 316, 323 (1895) (explaining 
Pennsylvania’s pardoning power); Young v. Young, 61 Tex. 191, 193 (1884) 
(explaining Texas’ pardoning power); Lee v. Murphy, 63 Va. (22 Gratt.) 789, 797 
(1872) (explaining Virginia’s pardoning power).  
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offender’s family or community) has suffered enough and no more 
punishment or disabilities are warranted under the circumstances.199 
Especially throughout the twentieth century, pardons were widely 
used to restore civil rights and remove the disabilities that result from 
a state conviction, including, as discussed above, immigration 
penalties.200 Sovereigns have also used pardons to promote social 
cohesion on a broad scale, particularly after times of civil unrest.201 
State laws providing for expungements, vacaturs, and similar 
procedures on rehabilitative grounds similarly further state interests in 
encouraging reformation, conserving state and local resources, and 
renewing membership rights in appropriate cases. Studies have 
documented the decline in recidivism associated with restoration of 
civil status through these kinds of processes.202 
Many states also use diversionary programs and other deferred 
adjudication processes to conserve vital state resources as well as to 
encourage rehabilitation.203 A study by the Vera Institute of state 
sentencing policies from 2001 to 2010 shows that states have “found it 
increasingly difficult to justify using the most expensive intervention 
— prison — for people convicted of low-level property and drug 
 
 199 See, e.g., State ex rel. Van Orden v. Sauvinet, 24 La. Ann. 119, 121 (1872) (“We 
can scarcely think it compatible with the genius of liberal government and free 
institutions, that there should be no shield to protect an individual against a 
tyrannical exercise by a judge of his power to punish for contempt . . . a hasty and 
petulant fiat of a judge.”); Perkins v. Stevens, 41 Mass. (24 Pick.) 277, 278-80 (1834) 
(“It is only a full pardon of the offence which can wipe away the infamy of the 
conviction, and restore the convict to his civil rights.”). 
 200 See Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1183, 1186, 1190-91 (2010) [hereinafter Twilight] (noting that 
most presidential pardons after 1930 were granted “to restore civil rights” including 
many “to avert deportation”); see also supra Part I.B (providing examples of 
gubernatorial pardons used to remove immigration consequences). 
 201 See, for example: John Adams’s pardoning of the Fries’ Rebels; the wide-scale 
Civil War era pardons exercised by Abraham Lincoln, Andrew Johnson, and Ulysses S. 
Grant; Theodore Roosevelt’s pardoning of Filipinos convicted of crimes while under 
Spanish rule; and Jimmy Carter’s pardons of Vietnam Selective Service Act violators. 
See MOORE, supra note 16, at 51, 63, 81. 
 202 See, e.g., JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF 
PRISONER REENTRY 168-70 (2005) (citing a range of studies). 
 203 Margaret Colgate Love, Alternative to Conviction: Deferred Adjudication as a Way 
of Avoiding Collateral Consequences, 22 FED. SENT’G REP. 6, 6-13 (2009) [hereinafter 
Alternative to Conviction]; SECOND CHANCES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: 
ALTERNATIVES TO INCARCERATION AND REENTRY STRATEGIES, COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE 
CRIMINAL SANCTIONS, AMER. BAR ASSOC. 13-15 (2007), available at http:// 
www.pardonlaw.com/materials/rev_2ndchance(3).pdf.  
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offenses . . . .”204 The Pennsylvania code identifies the purposes of 
deferred adjudication programs as “the rehabilitation of the offender” 
and “the prompt disposition of charges, eliminating the need for costly 
and time-consuming trials or other court proceedings.”205 In 
Connecticut, alternative sentencing programs have rendered prison 
“the option of last resort” due to its comparative costliness.206 In New 
York, Oregon, and Michigan, prosecutors have endorsed diversionary 
programs out of recognition that they reduce recidivism.207 And many 
states directly acknowledge that a purpose of deferred adjudication 
programs is to help defendants avoid the collateral consequences of a 
conviction in appropriate cases.208 Incarceration prevents offenders 
from working, which in many cases directly impacts their families and 
communities. Even after release, a criminal record makes it difficult 
for many offenders to find employment, retain low-income housing or 
other benefits, or obtain loans. These and other collateral 
consequences impede offenders’ abilities to provide for their families 
and themselves, often leading to cycles of recidivism and 
incarceration.209 
Through diversionary programs, rehabilitative expungements, and 
pardons, state and local governments can adjust the social impact of 
convictions. These tools are of increasing importance, especially in 
minor, mostly public-order cases, where, as recent studies and 
scholars have shown, convictions often are produced en masse in a 
system driven more by efficiency than evidence.210 
 
 204 Adrienne Austin, CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRENDS: KEY LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN 
SENTENCING POLICY, 2001-2010, VERA INST. OF JUST., 2 (Sept. 2010). 
 205 See Committee Introduction to Ch. 3, THE PENNSYLVANIA CODE, http://www. 
pacode.com/secure/data/234/chapter3/chap3toc.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2012).  
 206 See COMM’N ON EFFECTIVE CRIM. SANCTIONS, AMER. BAR ASSOC., supra note 203, at 13. 
 207 Id. at 14-15. 
 208 Love, Alternative to Conviction, supra note 203, at 6-13. 
 209 See, e.g., Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in 
the Lower Criminal Courts, 45 UC DAVIS L. REV. 277, 300 (2012) (“The large number 
and harsh nature of collateral consequences illustrate how even a low-level conviction 
that seems to begin with arrest and end in front of the judge can actually have an 
impact not only on that person’s life, but also on the lives of family members and the 
person’s community.”). 
 210 See, e.g., Boruchowitz, Brink, & Dimino, supra note 196, at 11, 14 (presenting 
evidence that the majority of public defenders who represent misdemeanor defendants 
are likely to be over-burdened, inexperienced, and subjected to pressure from the 
prosecutor and judge to encourage rapid assents to the government’s plea offers); Josh 
Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 
110 COLUM. L. REV. 1655, 1705-06 (2010) (arguing that in low-stakes cases, the 
defendant’s actual culpability is presumed or irrelevant); John D. King, Procedural 
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Thus, in addition to saving the state the fiscal costs of incarceration, 
states use diversionary programs and expungement processes to break 
cycles of recidivism and reduce the impact on the offenders’ families 
and communities. But in many instances, these programs will not be 
viable alternatives for noncitizens, with the result that neither the 
individual nor the community will benefit.211 In general, the incentive 
to avoid removal, which is now all but ordained for many categories of 
convictions, will usually far outweigh all other concerns for lawful 
permanent residents. As the Supreme Court put it, “[p]reserving the 
client’s right to remain in the United States may be more important to 
the client than any potential jail sentence.”212 When the defendant is 
less willing to plead to certain offenses or accept diversionary 
dispositions in early stages of the process out of fear of deportation, 
this in turn consumes more of the state’s prosecutorial, judicial, and 
defense resources.213 
 
Justice, Collateral Consequences, and the Adjudication of Misdemeanors, in THE 
PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 
2011) (unpublished manuscript) (“Efficiency is by far the predominant animating 
value in misdemeanor prosecutions in the United States today, and there is a vast 
distance between that value and whichever one comes in second.”); Alexandra 
Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 4-5), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2010826 (“Far from 
accidental, the slipshod quality of petty offense processing is a dominant systemic 
norm that competes vigorously with and sometimes overwhelms foundational values 
of due process and adversarial adjudication.”); Roberts, supra note 209, at 306-09 
(discussing the structural features of misdemeanor courts that produce coercion in the 
plea bargain process). 
 211 A few examples of states that require guilty pleas before entering community 
supervision or other kinds of diversionary programs include New York, Michigan, 
Georgia, and Oklahoma. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-13-2 (West 2012) (drug treatment); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 769.4a (West 2012) (domestic violence); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS. ANN. § 600.1068 (West 2012) (drug treatment); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 216.05.4 (West 2012) (judicial diversion); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 3-452 (West 
2012) (drug treatment). 
 212 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 322 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 213 As of 1999, at least twenty-one states funded nearly all of the working indigent 
public defense offices. See Carol J. DeFrances, DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU OF JUST. 
STATISTICS STATE-FUNDED INDIGENT DEFENSE SERVICES, 1999, 1 (2001), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sfids99.pdf (noting that in 1999, twenty-one 
states funded 90% or more of indigent criminal defense). Many other states partially 
fund indigent public defense. See, e.g., Welcome to Washington State OPD, 
WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF PUBLIC DEFENSE, http://www.opd.wa.gov (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2012) (noting that the mission of the Washington State Office of Public 
Defense is “to ensure the effective and efficient delivery of indigent defense services 
funded by the state” (internal quotations omitted)). 
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Pardons and other post-conviction processes also restore (or 
occasionally preserve) membership status that the state takes away 
through its criminal apparatus.214 Penal law regulates in part by using 
or threatening the power of the state to revoke or alter the 
membership of those subject to its jurisdiction. When a person is 
convicted, their membership status changes. Most directly, a convicted 
person’s membership in the community is revoked (at least 
temporarily) by incarceration. But even after the initial sentence is 
served, membership continues to be altered through the stigma and 
collateral consequences that follow a conviction. These civil 
disabilities thus become “instruments of ‘social exclusion,’” creating “a 
permanent diminution in social status of convicted offenders, a 
distancing between ‘us’ and ‘them.’”215 Provision in the law for 
pardons, even if only sparingly used, reflects a society’s recognition 
that a return to membership is always on the table, and that “no one 
ever completely forfeits their humanity.”216 This particular function 
does not completely map onto the immigration rules, of course, 
because the national government has primary say in the membership 
decisions about noncitizens. But a sovereign’s right to revoke or 
restore membership consequences that follow from its own criminal 
law is distinct. Though the federal government may have the power 
where noncitizens are concerned to displace or trump the membership 
decisions that states implement through the use pardons, our rules of 
interpretation should assume that Congress would choose to do so 
carefully and deliberately. 
D. Resource Allocation and Other Costs 
Another significant consequence of these federal rules is that states 
may be forced to invest in more sophisticated procedures to facilitate 
the state interests discussed above, such as error-correction and 
individuation in punishment. Specifically, states may have to expend 
more upfront resources in almost every case involving noncitizens, 
 
 214 See Andrew Brien, Mercy Within Legal Justice, 24 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 83, 83-
84 (1998). 
 215 Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in 
INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT, supra 
note 35, at 19. 
 216 Daniel T. Kobil, Mercy in Clemency Decisions, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND 
CLEMENCY 36, 52-54 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007). Kobil takes as a 
symbolic example the story of Billy Moore. After release from prison in 1991 following 
his commutation from death row in Georgia, Billy became a minister and a friend of 
the family of the man he had murdered many years ago. Id. at 54, 62 n.99. 
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because they cannot count on back-end remedies for situations where 
the state system produced flawed convictions, or where the severity of 
the immigration consequence far outweighs the state penalty. 
Although the Supreme Court held in Argersinger v. Hamlin that a 
defendant’s right to counsel extends to misdemeanor prosecutions,217 
states and localities are not constitutionally required to provide 
counsel where there is no threat of incarceration. Unsurprisingly, 
many states permit convictions against defendants without a right to 
counsel for offenses not punishable by imprisonment.218 New Jersey, 
for example, has a range of “Disorderly Persons” offenses,219 for which 
no right to counsel attaches under state law if the prosecutor does not 
seek jail time for the offender.220 Yet minor offenses, even if 
uncounseled, can trigger deportation and other serious immigration 
consequences,221 as recently upheld by the BIA.222 
 
 217 Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 30-34 (1972) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment prohibits states from incarcerating indigent defendants without providing 
defense counsel in the criminal prosecution, regardless of whether the charge is a 
felony or misdemeanor); see also Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 667 (2002) 
(holding that courts cannot impose incarceration on the basis of a misdemeanor 
probation violation unless the defendant had counsel in the underlying adjudication). 
 218 See, e.g., ARK. R. CRIM. P. 8.2(b) (2003); CONN. GEN STAT. § 51-296(a) (2011); 
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(b)(1) (West 2009); ME. R. CRIM. P. 44(a)(1) (West 2009); MASS. 
ANN. LAWS ch. 211D, § 2B (West 2011); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 44(a)(2) (West 2009); OHIO 
CRIM. R. 44(B) (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-3-10 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
§ 23A-40-6.1 (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5201(4)-(5), 5231 (West 2009); 
VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-160 (West 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-6-102(a)(v) (West 
2009). See generally Alice Clapman, Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a 
Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel for Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 
CARDOZO L. REV. 585 (2011) (arguing that the rule that defendants who do not face 
incarceration have no right to counsel requires reexamination where deportation is a 
consequence of the conviction). 
 219 See N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:1-4(b) (West 1981). 
 220 See N.J. Ct. R. § 7:3-2(b) (2004), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ 
rules/r7-3.htm (providing that the court will assign a municipal public defender or 
assign counsel to an indigent defendant who faces a “consequence of magnitude”); 
N.J. Ct. R., Second Appendix to Part VII Guidelines for Determination of 
Consequence of Magnitude (2004), available at http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/ 
rules/r7-2nd_appendix.htm (stating that the judge is to consider, inter alia, whether a 
sentence of imprisonment will be imposed); Rodriguez v. Rosenblatt, 58 N.J. 281, 295 
(1971). There is no blanket right to counsel in New Jersey. 
 221 Many of the New Jersey Disorderly Persons offenses, for example, could lead to 
deportation. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:21-2.4 (West 2001) (passing bad checks); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:35-10(a)(4) (West 1997) (possession of less than fifty grams of 
marijuana); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:20-8 (West 1997) (theft of services); see also Castillo v. 
Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 411 Fed. Appx. 500, 502-03 (3d Cir. 2011) (remanding to 
BIA to determine in the first instance whether conviction for a “disorderly person’s 
offense” under former version of the New Jersey law is a “crime” triggering removal 
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An upshot, then, of federal rules that severely curtail the 
effectiveness of the state’s traditional post-conviction remedies is that 
if states want to ensure the integrity of the justice system and reduce 
the impact of minor convictions in deserving cases, they may have to 
invest more resources in preconviction processes. For example, states 
would need to provide counsel for noncitizens arrested for minor 
offenses even where not constitutionally required and to better fund 
existing defender offices.223 But these kinds of expenditures are 
prohibitively costly for most jurisdictions, and lack of representation 
has been recognized as a systemic problem in misdemeanor courts 
throughout the country.224 The restrictive immigration rules thus 
impede the states’ freedom to use back-end processes to help ensure 
the integrity of their administration of criminal justice. 
As described above, the loss of many types of diversionary programs 
as an option for many nonresidents represents a significant cost of 
implementing the federal rules. Deferred adjudication programs are 
attractive to states because they avoid trial, encourage rehabilitation, 
are less punitive in appropriate cases, and save the state money on trial 
litigation.225 If diversionary programs are not a viable option for 
noncitizens, there will be more trials and/or more incarceration, 
intensifying the resources expended by the state or local jurisdiction. 
Removing the effectiveness of post-conviction relief for noncitizen 
residents may also undermine the state goals of rehabilitation and 
integration.226 
 
under the crime involving moral turpitude category); Hussein v. Attorney Gen. of the 
U.S., 413 Fed. Appx. 431, 433-35 (3d Cir. 2010) (deferring to BIA’s determination 
that New Jersey disorderly person’s offense conviction for possessing drug 
paraphernalia constituted removable offense relating to a controlled substance); 
Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 850, 860 (B.I.A. 2012) (holding that a municipal 
marijuana violation with no right to counsel counts as a conviction for immigration 
purposes). 
 222 See Cuellar-Gomez, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 860 (holding that a municipal marijuana 
violation with no right to counsel counts as a conviction for immigration purposes). 
 223 See supra text accompanying notes 217-18. 
 224 See Gratton, supra note 195, at 1045-49 (describing the nationwide indigent 
defense crisis); Cade, supra note 12, at 20-23 (summarizing reports and articles 
concerning the frequent lack of appointed representation in minor cases). The 
misdemeanor representation problem is complicated by Padilla v. Kentucky, which 
held that the Sixth Amendment requires counsel to advise noncitizen defendants 
about the deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 
1473, 1486 (2010). 
 225 See supra Part II.C. 
 226 See supra Part II.C. 
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In addition to the implementation costs for the state system that 
result from the decreased incentives for noncitizens to agree to certain 
dispositions, the Board’s interpretation of the INA can also lead to 
circumvention costs where the state actors endeavor to work around 
the limited effect given to post-conviction proceedings.227 Because 
judicial vacaturs will only prevent removability if granted on the basis 
of a procedural defect or other non-rehabilitative grounds, noncitizens 
have an incentive to frame all post-conviction attacks as on the merits. 
And again, because deportation is such a severe penalty, judges and 
prosecutors may sometimes be complicit in the pretense.228 In some 
cases courts are simply silent about the reasons post-conviction relief 
is granted; in others evidence of rehabilitation appears to have been 
important factor in achieving a vacatur despite the court’s 
characterization of the relief as procedural.229 The varied application of 
the rules limiting the consequences of expungements that are not on 
the merits may result in fairness costs, including disparities in 
outcomes for similarly situated defendants within or across states or 
localities.230 
Deporting someone who still has a direct appeal pending also raises 
substantial due process concerns. Some states, for example, have 
dismissed the criminal appeals of noncitizens that have been deported 
as moot.231 Even where the appeal is not mooted by the defendant’s 
removal, it may be very difficult to access counsel and to prepare a 
successful appeal once he or she has been deported.232 Many public 
 
 227 See Robert A. Mikos, Enforcing State Law in Congress’s Shadow, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1411, 1422-33 (2005) (explaining the hidden implementation, circumvention, 
and fairness costs of federal collateral consequences in general for states). 
 228 See Moore, supra note 127, at 669 (describing how judges “shape their decisions 
granting post-conviction relief to make it appear as though there is a substantive and 
procedural problem with the underlying criminal proceeding”). 
 229 See id. at 701-04 (discussing cases where there is evidence that state vacaturs 
were motivated by rehabilitative or deportation concerns). 
 230 Cf. Mikos, supra note 227, at 1427-32 (discussing the fairness costs that result 
from differences in underlying state criminal laws that give rise to the federal 
sanctions).  
 231 See, e.g., Gokhale, supra note 136, at 264 (collecting cases from other states); 
Labe M. Richman, Deported Defendants: Challenging Convictions From Outside U.S.?, 
N.Y.L.J., June 14, 2006, available at http://nycrimbar.org/Members/WhatsNew/ 
Articles/NYLJ-06-14-06.html (collecting New York Appellate Division cases that 
dismissed criminal appeals as moot following deportation). But see People v. Ventura, 
17 N.Y.3d 675, 681-82 (2011) (holding that intermediate appellate court abused its 
discretion in dismissing the timely filed appeal of defendants involuntarily deported 
while their appeals were pending). 
 232 Cf. Thapa v. Gonzales, 460 F.3d 323, 331 (2d Cir. 2006) (recognizing the 
difficulties faced by an alien in pursuing an effective immigration appeal while 
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interest offices have resource constraints or other restrictions that 
would not allow them to represent a defendant who is residing in 
another country. 
E. Checks and Balances 
Scholars have observed that pardons and other clemency powers are 
vested with the chief executive in part as checks on the power of the 
legislature to define criminal law and the power of the judiciary to 
apply those laws and punishments.233 For example, pardons can signal 
to the legislative branch the need for law reform.234 As a Justice 
Department study noted in 1939, the pardon “has been the tool by 
which many of the most important reforms in the substantive criminal 
law have been introduced.”235 
Ohio Governor Richard Celeste, for instance, granted clemency to 
numerous women who had killed their batterers in an effort to achieve 
systemic changes in criminal prosecutions and sentencing at the trial 
level.236 Governor Ryan’s commutations of death row inmates in 
Illinois similarly served to bring attention to systemic errors in the 
justice system.237 The reforming function of pardons can also be seen 
in Governor George Washington Donaghey’s 1912 pardoning of 360 
men serving long sentences for minor felonies in Arkansas’s 
notoriously harsh penitentiary and convict-lease prison system. 
Governor Donaghey labeled their punishment a “revengeful hell,” 
citing black men sentenced to as long as thirty-six years for forging 
orders for 18 quarts of whiskey and a youth who died after being 
 
abroad); Dorelien v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 317 F.3d 1314, 1325 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(describing IIRIRA’s authorization of appeals from abroad as a “Herculean task”). 
 233 See CROUCH, supra note 177, at 14-19 (discussing the check and balance feature 
of presidential pardon power); Rachel Barkow, The Ascent of the Administrative State 
and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1361-62 (2008); Jerry Carannate, 
What to Do about the Executive Clemency Power in the Wake of the Clinton Presidency?, 
47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 325, 347 (2003); see also Ex Parte U.S., 242 U.S. 27, 41-42 (1916). 
 234 Love, Twilight, supra note 200, at 1184. 
 235 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 3 THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S SURVEY OF RELEASE 
PROCEDURES: PARDON 295-96 (1939) (describing how pardons led to formal legal 
recognition of self-defense, insanity, and infancy defenses). 
 236 Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A 
Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 217, 321 (2003) (describing Governor 
Celeste’s goal of systemic changes in the trial process through his “clemency project”); 
Richard F. Celeste, Executive Clemency: One Executive’s Real Life Decisions, 31 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 139, 141-42 (2003). Governor Celeste also granted eight death penalty 
commutations in 1991. 
 237 See Barkow, supra note 233, at 1361-62. 
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forced to work in blazing heat with a fever.238 Some criticized the 
pardons at the time because the governor used them to accomplish the 
end of the convict-lease system, an objective he had not been able to 
achieve through the legislature.239 But Donaghey’s actions illustrate 
that the pardon power can be a politically complex means of checking 
the administration of criminal laws by other state actors.240 
Pardons were also used more recently to rectify the actions of a 
corrupt police officer named Tom Coleman in Tulia, Texas.241 In 1999, 
Coleman arrested forty-six persons for drug distribution. Although 
there was no physical evidence in any of the cases, thirty-eight were 
convicted on the sole basis of Coleman’s testimony, some receiving jail 
sentences as long as ninety years. Four years later, Officer Coleman’s 
testimony was found to be not credible, and Governor Perry pardoned 
thirty-five of the wrongly convicted residents.242 
It is not difficult to imagine situations in which a governor might 
wish to issue pardons to noncitizens to curb overreaching law 
enforcement or legislatures. There is recent evidence, for example, that 
some localities have used the criminal apparatus to systematically 
harass and discriminate against foreign-born residents.243 The current 
 
 238 See George W. Donaghey, Why I Could Not Pardon the Contract System, in 45 
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 22, 22 (1913); 
Governor To Free 360 Convicts To-Day: Donaghey of Arkansas Uses Pardoning Power as 
Blow at Long-Fought Lease System, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 1912, at 1.  
 239 See Governors Discuss the Granting of Pardons, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1913, at 
SM11. 
 240 See infra Part III.C. 
 241 See generally NATE BLAKESLEE, TULIA: RACE, COCAINE, AND CORRUPTION IN A SMALL 
TEXAS TOWN (2005) (discussing this story); ANGELA DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE 
POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 40 (2007) (same). 
 242 See DAVIS, supra note 241, at 40; Gov. Perry pardons 35 Tulia defendants, 
CNN.COM (Aug. 22, 2003), http://articles.cnn.com/2003-08-22/justice/tulia.pardons_ 
1_pardons-narcotics-trafficking-task-force-regional-narcotics-trafficking-task?_s=PM: 
LAW. 
 243 See, e.g., Billy Ball, DOJ ends federal immigration program in Alamance County, 
INDYWEEK.COM (Sept. 26, 2012) (reporting on a Department of Justice report accusing 
Alamance County, North Carolina deputies and Sheriff Terry Johnson of biased 
policing against immigrants); Peter Applebome, Police Gang Tyrannized Latinos, 
Indictment Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2012, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/25/nyregion/connecticut-police-officers-accused-of-
mistreating-latinos.html (discussing the arrest of four police officers in East Haven 
following a Justice Department investigation of their mistreatment of immigrants, 
particularly Hispanic residents); Marc Lacey, U.S. Says Arizona Sheriff Shows Pervasive 
Bias Against Latinos, N.Y. TIMES. Dec. 16, 2011, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/16/us/arizona-sheriffs-office-unfairly-targeted-
latinos-justice-department-says.html (reporting the Justice Department’s finding of “a 
pervasive culture of discriminatory bias against Latinos” within the Maricopa County 
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federal scheme, by curtailing the effect of pardons for deportation 
purposes, could impede a governor’s ability to fully counteract the 
damage done by this kind of discriminatory prosecution. 
Consequently, the intragovernmental intricacies attendant to any 
exercise of the pardon power should inform construction of statutory 
text that does not unequivocally express congressional intent to 
restrict pardons in ways that may impact this checking function. 
F. Democratic Accountability 
Finally, the federalism goal of democratic accountability is 
jeopardized when a governor’s pardon is not given effect in 
immigration proceedings. Governors are the democratically elected 
chief executives of each sovereign state. As chief executives, they bear 
ultimate responsibility and authority for proper implementation of the 
state’s laws. Federalism recognizes that decisions about how to punish 
and who to forgive for transgressions of the laws of a sovereign are 
best made by the sovereign itself, within the bounds of the 
constitution. Pardons are “lodged in the governor, not for the benefit 
of the convict only, but for the welfare of the people, who may 
properly insist upon the performance of that duty by him, if a pardon 
is to be granted.”244 If governors do not execute such duties in ways 
that are sufficiently responsive to “localized priorities,” they may pay 
the price on Election Day.245 In general, local governments should be 
accountable for processes that impact perception of the systemic 
integrity of the criminal justice system, as well as the importance of 
membership decisions and the community impact of convictions 
under that government’s laws. 
G. Conclusion 
The interests that pardons, deferred adjudications, appeals, and 
other post-conviction processes serve — systemic legitimacy, 
 
Sheriff’s Office); TREVOR GARDNER & AARTI KOHLI, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN 
INSTITUTE ON RACE, ETHNICITY & DIVERSITY, THE C.A.P. EFFECT: RACIAL PROFILING IN 
THE ICE CRIMINAL ALIEN PROGRAM 1 (Sept. 2009), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/policybrief_irving_FINAL.pdf (describing how 
“immediately after Irving, Texas law enforcement had 24-hour access . . . to ICE in the 
local jail, discretionary arrests of Hispanics for petty offenses — particularly minor 
traffic offenses — rose dramatically”). 
 244 Rich v. Chamberlain, 104 Mich. 436, 441 (1895) (noting that pardons are “as 
much an official duty as any other act”). 
 245 Cf. Morrison, supra note 168, at 85 (discussing how the electoral accountability 
of state attorneys general incentivizes them to be responsive to “localized priorities”). 
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calibrated punishment, restoration of membership, resource 
allocation, and sometimes even law reform — are central to sovereign 
control over criminal justice and to governance more broadly. 
Individuals, of course, feel these impacts too. The federal rules directly 
affect the noncitizens (and indirectly their families and communities) 
whose right to remain in this country hinges on the immigration 
consequences of a pardon or other state procedure. More broadly, the 
federal rules affect the citizens and taxpayers whose criminal cases 
play out differently as the state system absorbs and compensates for 
the consequences of the federal rules for noncitizens. None of this is to 
say that Congress cannot constitutionally enact laws with these sorts 
of impacts on state institutions and individuals, whatever the cost for 
federalism values. Within Congress’s sphere of authority, its law is 
supreme so long as it does not transgress other constitutional 
limitations. Congress’s power to set immigration policy, the Supreme 
Court has long held, is at least as plenary as any of its enumerated 
powers.246 
But it is not at all clear that Congress intended or even considered 
the intrusions of these federal rules on traditional state authority. 
Certainly the INA does not expressly indicate congressional intent to 
override pardons, appeals, or expungements, nor does the legislative 
record suggest that these post-conviction processes were on legislators’ 
minds in enacting the definition of conviction for immigration 
purposes.247 And as discussed above, the agency, government, and 
courts have interpreted the relevant statutory provisions of the INA in 
diverse and inconsistent ways, casting doubt on the clarity of the 
statutory text.248 
A political risk, pardons are now infrequently granted in most 
states.249 The limitations on the effectiveness of pardons to prevent 
deportation that the Board and courts have read into the INA may 
make governors even more reluctant to exercise the power, regardless 
of whether the pardon would otherwise be appropriate on justice or 
mercy grounds. If the pardon will not actually return a person to the 
place previously occupied in the community because he or she will be 
deported, a governor is likely to give the pardon request less 
consideration, no matter the merits of the pardon petition. When New 
 
 246 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972). 
 247 See infra Part III. 
 248 See supra Part I. 
 249 See Barkow, supra note 233, at 1349; Daniel T. Kobil, How to Grant Clemency in 
Unforgiving Times, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 219, 223-24 (2003); Love, Twilight, supra note 
200, at 1205. 
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York Governor David Paterson decided in 2010 to expedite and 
expand consideration of pardon applications from immigrant residents 
facing removal, many potential applicants were affirmatively advised 
by experienced immigration attorneys not to bother applying, 
regardless of whatever evidence there might be of their rehabilitation, 
community and family ties, or other factors supporting their eligibility 
for clemency.250 We can surmise that of the more than 1,000 
applicants, at least some were unsuccessful not because of the lack of 
merit in their applications, but because of the panel’s doubts about the 
efficacy of a pardon to prevent removal in their particular cases. 
Though Congress likely can constitutionally attach federal 
consequences to a state conviction without giving effect to pardons, 
whatever the direct or indirect influence this policy might have on a 
governor’s decision to use the pardon power, it is important to be clear 
whether Congress in fact intended to impose such a significant 
externality on a state’s sovereign power. In the next Part, I argue that 
doubts about congressional intent to intrude on gubernatorial pardon 
decisions and similar state powers should inform construction of the 
INA in a way that will respect Congress’s authority over immigration 
policy while ensuring that constitutional federalism values are not 
discarded as a byproduct of an agency’s interpretation of a statutory 
provision lacking sufficient clarity. 
III. A FEDERALISM CANON FOR FEDERAL IMMIGRATION POLICY 
As the first two Parts of this Article demonstrate, federal 
immigration rules limiting pardons and other post-conviction 
procedures implicate processes that implement and embody state 
interests at the center of government authority. In this Part, I argue 
that where Congress has not made explicitly clear its intention to 
intrude on these sovereign processes in the language of the statute, 
agencies and courts should interpret the statute in ways that preserve 
state authority. The use of this federalism canon of construction would 
ensure that Congress has directly confronted whether to override state 
autonomy over generally applicable governmental processes.251 
 
 250 See, e.g., IMMIGRATION PARDON PROJECT, PRO BONO ATTORNEY’S PARDON 
APPLICATION PROCEDURE ¶ 7, available at http://www.reentry.net/ny/library/ 
folder.328444 (advising that the foremost component of the pardon application 
should be to identify “what forms of immigration relief would be available to your 
client upon receiving a pardon”). 
 251 See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 331-32 
(2000); Ernest A. Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, and the 
Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549, 1603-09 (2000) [hereinafter 
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As I noted at the outset of this Article, this approach is a 
recognizable means of safeguarding state authority. The Court has 
increasingly used clear statement canons to protect federalism 
values.252 To date, however, the Court has not had occasion to apply a 
federalism canon in the immigration context, although it has used 
other kinds of clear statement rules in the service of construing the 
INA so as not to disturb important constitutional values.253 In INS v. 
St. Cyr,254 for example, the Court declined to apply legislation to 
conduct occurring before its enactment where Congress had not 
plainly indicated that it “specifically considered the potential 
unfairness that retroactive application would produce.”255 As I show 
below, the justifications underlying the use of a federalism canon 
where the construction of federal law threatens a state’s core power to 
determine the continuing validity of its own convictions apply with at 
least as much force in the immigration context as in other areas of 
federal authority. 
A. The Supreme Court’s Federalism Canon 
The Court’s federalism canon requires an unequivocal expression of 
congressional intent before interpreting a statute to impede or infringe 
on state sovereign powers.256 In Gregory v. Ashcroft257 — the first case 
to fully express this canon — the Supreme Court construed the federal 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act not to apply to state judges.258 
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion acknowledged that the Court’s 
interpretation of the statute was strained, but nevertheless held that 
statutes should not be interpreted to “upset the usual constitutional 
 
Constitutional Avoidance] (explaining that the Court’s clear statement rules protect 
underenforced constitutional norms). 
 252 See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 19, at 619-29; Manning, supra note 24, at 
403. 
 253 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (employing the presumption 
against retroactivity and the canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret the effect of 
the 1996 amendments to the INA). 
 254 Id. at 291. 
 255 Id. at 317; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 576 (2006) (requiring a 
clear statement from Congress to replace traditional adjudication procedures in 
terrorism prosecutions). 
 256 Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1990) (emphasis added) (“[I]nasmuch 
as this Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the protection of the 
States against intrusive exercises of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers, we must be 
absolutely certain that Congress intended such an exercise.”). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. at 467. 
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balance of federal and state powers” unless Congress has made “its 
intention to do so ‘unmistakably clear in the language of the 
statute.’”259 
Unlike the related presumption against preemption,260 the 
federalism canon appears to require more than evidence of 
congressional intent to preempt state law. If stringently applied, the 
Court’s federalism canon demands a clear statutory statement of intent 
to displace core state functions.261 In the absence of an explicit textual 
indication of Congress’s intent to intrude on areas of state sovereignty, 
the federalism canon requires those implementing a statute to 
interpret it in such a way as to protect areas of traditional authority 
even where this would not be the most straightforward 
construction.262 And though the process of identifying “traditional 
state functions” can be ambiguous at the fringes, the potential for 
error is tolerable because Congress can subsequently clarify its 
intent.263 
Part of the justification in Gregory for a super-strong interpretive 
rule against congressional intrusion on state sovereignty was based on 
the limitations of any other means of enforcing constitutional 
federalism. The Court’s previous decision in Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority,264 although acknowledging the 
importance of state sovereignty, essentially left the national political 
process as the only safeguard against federal regulation of core state 
functions.265 Justice O’Connor tied the narrowness of that legislative 
remedy to the need for a strong federalism canon: “[I]nasmuch as this 
Court in Garcia has left primarily to the political process the 
 
 259 Id. at 460-61; see also id. at 461 (“States retain substantial sovereign powers 
under our constitutional scheme, powers with which Congress does not readily 
interfere.”). 
 260 The presumption against preemption “start[s] with the assumption that the 
historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act 
unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
 261 Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of 
Federalism, in PREEMPTION CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S 
CORE QUESTION 13, 13, 28 (William W. Buzbee ed., 2009).  
 262 See, e.g., Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
531 U.S. 159, 172-73 (2001) (invalidating a federal agency’s interpretive rule that 
asserted federal jurisdiction over intrastate waters under the Clean Water Act, as this 
might serve as an “encroachment upon a traditional state power” without a clear 
statutory mandate); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1991). 
 263 Young, Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 251, at 1606-07. 
 264 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 265 Id. at 552, 556 (overruling Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)).  
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protection of the States against intrusive exercises of Congress’[s] 
Commerce Clause powers, we must be absolutely certain that 
Congress intended such an exercise.”266 
The use of a federalism canon is especially appropriate to evaluate 
the statutory provisions considered in this Article, because the 
immigration scheme predicates deportation on state criminal law 
processes but, as interpreted, does so in piecemeal fashion. Congress 
relies heavily on the states to identify, prosecute and sentence criminal 
noncitizens. But under the prevailing interpretation of the statute, the 
federal government ignores some state decisions to correct mistakes, 
reintegrate the most sympathetic offenders, allocate scarce resources, 
and so on. 
The argument for reliance on the national political process to 
safeguard federalism also rests upon presumptions that generally are 
not applicable in the immigration context.267 The federal political 
process that is structured to take the interests of states into account “is 
not engaged unless Congress turns its attention to the particular issue 
at hand.”268 However, as was the case with the amendments to the INA 
in 1996, immigration provisions are frequently inserted as last minute 
riders to omnibus bills with little or no debate.269 A canon requiring 
explicit statutory clarity to override generally applicable police powers 
would highlight the federalism issues implicated, ensuring that 
deliberative legislative processes actually take place. 
Additionally, reliance on political process as a federalism safeguard 
assumes that congressional action will have similar effects for 
significantly large aggregates. But rules that limit the ability of pardons 
and other state procedures to remove immigration consequences will 
primarily affect only individuals with relatively little national political 
power. Even lawful permanent residents, though permanent members 
of national and local communities, lack the right to vote. The 
politically weak nature of those who are most affected by this 
particular invasion of state authority thus makes it important to have a 
rule requiring Congress to express its intentions clearly in the statute, 
because such a rule will force Congress to actually confront the 
 
 266 Gregory, 501 U.S. at 464 (emphasis added). 
 267 Cf. Bellia, supra note 159, at 1010-12 (discussing the limitations of political 
safeguards to protect state interests affected by the proposed Lawsuit Abuse Reduction 
Act of 2005). 
 268 Morrison, supra note 168, at 93-94. 
 269 See Morawetz, supra note 88, at 282 (describing controversial last-minute 
measures inserted into the 1996 immigration bills); Taylor, supra note 88, at 352-53 
(same). 
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federalism issues. Finally, the political processes argument presumes 
that if a statute invades state authority in some manner, states will 
react by coming to a consensus to act and amend the law. But it is 
often more difficult to undo federal legislation than to enact it, and 
immigration law is particularly entrenched.270 
In sum, whatever the merits of the political process argument in the 
usual case, the use of a federalism canon is especially appropriate 
where primary impact of the federal rules falls on an insular and 
politically powerless group of persons, as noncitizens in state criminal 
justice systems surely are. An interpretive rule mandating statutory 
clarity will ensure that Congress, rather than an agency virtually 
immune from political checks, is making the decision to upset the 
usual federalism balance. 
B. The Plenary Power Objection 
In light of the great deference historically accorded Congress in 
setting immigration policy,271 some courts might hesitate to consider 
any federalism limit on Congress’s immigration power.272 While over 
 
 270 See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1 (2012) (describing how the various dynamics producing the 
structure of modern immigration law create powerful obstacles to legislative change); 
Bellia, supra note 159, at 1012 (arguing that federal legislation restricting state 
authority is easier to enact than repeal). See also E. Donald Elliot, Comment to 
Obsolete Law—The Solutions, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 30, 2012, 9:00 AM), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2012/03/obsolete-law-0151-the-solutions/ 
255141 (“Congress can only take on a few big problems a year, usually in response to 
a crisis. Revisions of existing laws rarely rise to that level; most existing laws work 
badly, but tolerably badly, and thus do not rise above Congress’s threshold of pain.” 
(emphasis in original)); Ryan Young & Jacqueline Otto, The Big Repeal, THE AM. 
SPECTATOR (Aug. 9, 2011, 6:07 AM), http://spectator.org/archives/2011/ 08/09/the-big-
repeal (stating that repeal is politically expensive because “every program and 
regulation has its vocal defenders”). 
 271 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707 (1893) (“The right 
of a nation to expel or deport foreigners who have not been naturalized, or taken any 
steps towards becoming citizens of the country, rests upon the same grounds, and is 
as absolute and unqualified, as the right to prohibit and prevent their entrance into 
the country.”). 
 272 Very little case law has directly addressed federalism challenges based on 
conflicts between federal immigration laws and state laws of general applicability. The 
few exceptions do not reveal careful reasoning. See Herrera-Inirio v. INS, 208 F.3d 
299, 307-08 (1st Cir. 2000) (rejecting a Tenth Amendment challenge to treating a 
deferred adjudication followed by formal exoneration under Puerto Rican law as a 
conviction for immigration purposes because regulation of immigration is “uniquely a 
matter of federal, not local, concern”); ACLU of New Jersey, Inc. v. Cnty. of Hudson, 
799 A.2d 629, 639 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002), cert. denied, 803 A.2d 1162 (N.J. 
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time the Court has recognized some important constitutional limits on 
plenary power, the doctrine is still kicking around, well over one 
hundred years later.273 
But the plenary power doctrine is largely irrelevant to the 
application of a federalism canon, even in the immigration context. A 
court’s decision to apply a clear statement rule says nothing about the 
deference that Congress is due. Rather, the purpose of the interpretive 
rule is to ensure that it is in fact Congress that has determined to 
discard a constitutional value through legislation within its sphere of 
authority, rather than an agency or court. While implementation of a 
federalism canon thus does impose a “clarity tax” on federal 
legislation,274 that procedural burden is outweighed by the benefit of 
preserving state authority from inadvertent intrusion where pardons 
and other processes implementing generally applicable criminal laws 
are concerned.275 
Furthermore, it is worth observing that the Court’s 1983 decision 
INS v. Chadha276 makes even a substantive federalism challenge to 
plenary power at least plausible. In Chadha, the Court held that a 
provision in the INA authorizing either house of Congress to override 
an administrative officer’s grant of discretionary relief from 
deportation violated the Constitution’s requirements for law-making, 
including bicameralism and presentment to the President, thereby 
running afoul of separation of powers.277 Although the government 
vehemently invoked the plenary power doctrine,278 the Court tersely 
 
2002) (holding that an interim agency regulation prohibiting state jail officials from 
disclosing the identities of any detainees held on behalf of the INS superseded a New 
Jersey disclosure law requiring public disclosure of the identities of all jail inmates). 
But see Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different Approach 
to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004) (arguing that courts should not find 
preemption where Congress has not acted). 
 273 See generally Motomura, supra note 20 (describing how the plenary doctrine 
maintains that Congress and the Executive have broad and typically exclusive 
dominion over immigration decisions). 
 274 See Manning, supra note 24, at 403. 
 275 As should be clear from Part II, gubernatorial pardons and other criminal 
processes are distinct from state laws that regulate immigrants in some way on the 
basis of their status, raising questions about whether the state is encroaching on a field 
preempted by the federal government.  
 276 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
 277 Id. at 947-59. 
 278 See, e.g., Reply Brief of the House of Representatives at 2-14, INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919 (1982) (No. 80-1832), 1982 WL 607218 (devoting twelve pages to the 
argument that the plenary power doctrine should control the result in the case). At 
oral argument, counsel for the House of Representatives protested, “[N]either the 
presentment clause nor the general separation of powers doctrine can be said to be an 
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observed that while Congress has “plenary authority” over 
immigration policy, it must choose “a constitutionally permissible 
means of implementing that power.”279 
Read broadly, the Chadha decision stands for the proposition that 
deference to Congressional immigration power is inappropriate where 
the cost is invasion of territory constitutionally committed 
elsewhere.280 But again, the important point here is that a federalism 
canon does not substantively limit Congressional power. The canon 
ensures that Congress has carefully exercised its power before 
federalism values are disregarded. 
C. The Federalism Canon Applied to the Immigration Rules 
The federalism doctrine applies where Congress’s intent to intrude 
on traditional state authority is in question and another less invasive 
construction is plausible. Obviously, the impact of clear statement 
rules and other interpretive canons hinges on the clarity of the 
particular text at issue and other evidence of congressional intent. Of 
course, if the federalism canon requires an express statement in the 
text of the statute, as the Gregory Court suggested is necessary where 
an interpretation of the statute would displace core state functions, 
evidence of intent in the legislative history will be less relevant.281 The 
strength of the federalism canon to be applied may thus be critical in 
some cases. Below I consider whether the application of a federalism 
 
imperious restriction upon the choice of means selected by Congress to execute its 
power over the naturalization or deportation of aliens.” BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, 
CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC CONSTITUTIONAL STRUGGLE 204 (1990). Justice White 
too would have let the legislative veto provision survive at least this particular 
challenge in light of the Court’s proclamation that “[o]ver no conceivable subject is 
the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of 
aliens.”; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 1000 (White, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting and citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972)). 
 279 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 940-41. 
 280 Cf. Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary 
Congressional Power, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 255, 303 (1984) (indicating that the Chadha 
decision suggests a departure from the notion of plenary congressional power over 
immigration). Of course, the Court’s recognition in Chadha that the federal 
government’s implementation of immigration plenary power is subject to 
constitutionally structured limits on Congress, such as separation of powers, was 
based specifically on the Constitution’s textual requirements of bicameralism and 
presentment to the President. But, as discussed, the Constitution’s vertical structural 
limits come not from specific textual provisions but from the limited powers given to 
the national government. See supra Part II. 
 281 See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 
23 n.90 (2004). 
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clear statement rule is sufficient to overcome the agency’s limiting 
interpretation of the pardon clause and then turn briefly to the other 
post-conviction processes. 
As the following section shows, if courts apply a super-clear 
statement rule, the Board’s interpretation of the statute with respect to 
pardons may fail. On the other hand, if the federalism canon applied 
requires only a more modest thumb on the scale, the question may be 
closer. 
1. The Federalism Canon Applied to the Limitations on Pardons 
To be sure, beginning with the text of the statute, one might 
reasonably infer from the INA’s statutory text that Congress intended 
pardons to be effective only in the enumerated deportation categories. 
The BIA relied on the expressio unius cannon to support this 
interpretation.282 But this reading, even if the most straightforward 
construction, is not compelled. Congress has not directly stated in the 
INA that pardons will not be effective for any categories of 
deportation.283 As I argue here, an alternate construction of the statute 
is plausible for a number of reasons. 
As noted, the version of the INA in effect from 1956 to 1990 directly 
mandated that pardons would not preclude removal on the basis of 
drug offense convictions,284 confirming that Congress knows how to 
make explicit its intention to override traditional state authority when 
it wishes to do so. Because this prior provision was in effect at the 
same time that the INA specifically continued to list other deportation 
categories for which pardons would be a safety against removal, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Congress has not always had the expressio 
unius canon in mind when amending this particular provision to 
explicitly name pardons for some crimes and not others.285 
Turning to the legislative history — which, under a strict 
application of the federalism canon, is unnecessary — there is little to 
support the Board’s construction. Congress has barely debated the 
pardon section in the INA over the course of a century.286 
Additionally, nothing in the legislative record leading to the enactment 
 
 282 See supra text accompanying notes 82-99. 
 283 Cf. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 467 (1991) (“[I]n this case we are not 
looking for a plain statement that judges are excluded [from the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act]. We will not read the ADEA to cover state judges unless Congress 
has made it clear that judges are included.”(emphasis in original)). 
 284 See supra Part I.B.3. 
 285 Thanks to Anthony Ruiz, NYU Law School class of 2014, for this observation. 
 286 See supra Parts I.B-I.C. 
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of the federal definition of conviction in IIRIRA reveals congressional 
concern about the effect of executive pardons.287 Rather, it appears 
that Congress was focused on ensuring that deferred adjudications are 
treated as convictions where there has been a finding of guilt.288 Thus, 
with respect to pardons, the evidence of congressional intent to 
override state sovereign authority is at best mixed. That ambiguity is 
reflected in the inconsistencies across administrative and judicial 
decisions interpreting the effect of pardons on immigration 
consequences in other contexts, such as naturalization and 
discretionary relief. Unclear Congressional intent is also underscored 
by the fact that the U.S. Department of State came to a different 
interpretation of the enumerated crime involving moral turpitude 
category, determining that pardons would remove the inadmissibility 
consequences of such convictions.289 
The Board’s interpretation of the pardon section in the INA also 
leads to a number of highly problematic applications. These doubtful 
results lend additional support for an alternate construction that does 
not override state authority. First, the BIA’s interpretation leads to a 
plainly unconstitutional result with respect to the President’s pardon 
power. Since the 1952 Act, the text in the INA giving explicit effect to 
pardons in certain deportation categories has referred to both 
presidential and gubernatorial pardons in the same sentence.290 As a 
result, the logic of the Board’s linguistic interpretation of the INA 
would also deny preclusive effect to presidential pardons for 
convictions outside the enumerated categories, thus violating the 
Pardon Clause.291 
A long and undisturbed line of Supreme Court precedent 
interpreting the Pardon Clause makes clear that the President’s power 
to pardon “is not subject to legislative control. Congress can neither 
limit the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its exercise any class of 
offenders.”292 Thus, in United States v. Padelford,293 the Court held that 
 
 287 See supra text accompanying notes 88-89. 
 288 See supra Part I.D; see also infra text accompanying notes 305-308. 
 289 22 C.F.R. §§ 40.21(a)(5), 40.22(c) (2006) (directing consular officers not to 
consider visa applicants inadmissible on the basis of crimes involving moral turpitude 
that have been fully and unconditionally pardoned by a governor or the President). 
 290 See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 § 241(b), Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 
Stat. 208 (1952). See generally Part I.B (discussing these references in these 
categories). 
 291 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (providing that the President “shall have Power 
to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the United States, except in Cases 
of Impeachment”). 
 292 Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. 333, 380 (1866). See generally Morison, supra note 
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President Lincoln’s pardon “relieved [Padelford] from any penalty 
which he might have incurred,” including civil forfeiture of property 
for having aided the Confederate rebellion.294 Soon after, the Court 
rebuffed Congress’s attempt to restrict the effect of a Presidential 
pardon, admonishing that “the legislature cannot change the effect of 
such a pardon any more than the executive can change a law.”295 In 
subsequent cases, the Court continued to unequivocally confirm that a 
pardon “releases the offender from all disabilities imposed by the 
offense, and restores to him all his civil rights . . . .”296 
The fact that the Board’s construction of the text would logically 
lead to an unconstitutional application where the President’s power is 
concerned casts further doubt on the agency’s construction of the 
statute. If the INA were instead interpreted to give preclusive effect to 
full and unconditional pardons of both sovereigns, the potential for 
unconstitutional application of the statute to presidential pardons is 
avoided. It may be theoretically possible, if awkward, to sever and 
excise the language in the INA provision affecting presidential 
pardons.297 But the severability inquiry should not kick in until the 
constitutional question is reached.298 
The second problematic application of the prevailing interpretation 
of the pardon section in the INA has to do with the ability of 
immigration prosecutors to charge the same offense under alternate or 
multiple grounds of deportation. As discussed in Part I.D, because 
certain convictions fall within more than one category of deportation 
 
107, at 304-24 (describing the history of the Supreme Court’s Pardon Clause 
jurisprudence). 
 293 United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. 531, 543 (1869).  
 294 Id. While the statute at issue explicitly authorized presidential pardons, the 
Padelford Court did not address whether such authorization was strictly required. The 
Court later made clear, however, that the purported authorization was in fact 
superfluous. See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 139, 141 (1872). 
 295 Klein, 80 U.S. at 147-48. 
 296 Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 152 (1877); see also Boyd v. United States, 
142 U.S. 450, 453-54 (1892) (holding that pardon removes, as a consequence of a 
larceny conviction, the disability to testify as a witness). 
 297 See, e.g., Carlin Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546, 549 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(finding the words “obscene or indecent” severable from a provision of the Federal 
Communications Commission Authorization Act of 1983 that established conditions 
under which providers of an “obscene or indecent” message would have a defense to 
prosecution).  
 298 See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 107-09 (1976) (severing subsection H 
from those portions of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 that were first 
found “constitutionally infirm”). Moreover, the canon of constitutional avoidance 
requires courts to avoid the constitutional question, if possible, through an alternate 
construction. 
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— some of which are held to be negated by pardons and some of 
which are not — the agency’s rank and file prosecutors have 
unfettered discretion in many cases to choose whether to negate the 
effect of a gubernatorial or presidential pardon through the formal 
deportation charge. But this discretion permits arbitrary results. A 
unanimous Supreme Court recently admonished in Judulang v. 
Holder299 that the outcome of a noncitizen’s eligibility for relief from 
removal may not “rest on the happenstance of an immigration official’s 
charging decision.”300 Under the prevailing interpretation of the 
pardon provision, for many deportable crimes, “everything hangs on 
the fortuity of an individual official’s decision. An alien appearing 
before one official may suffer deportation; an identically situated alien 
appearing before another may gain the right to stay in this country.”301 
Additionally, there is little apparent rationality for which 
deportation categories would be removed by a pardon. Convictions for 
simple possession of a controlled substance, for example, trigger 
removal despite a pardon, while convictions for illicit drug trafficking 
would fall within the aggravated felony category and thus be 
precluded by a pardon. Similarly, it is possible that a governor’s 
pardon would be held ineffective where a judicial resentencing or 
vacatur (if on the merits) would eliminate the immigration 
consequence of the conviction. Recall Governor Paterson’s pardon of 
Marlon Powell’s drug offense. If, instead of the pardon, Powell had 
been resentenced as a Youthful Offender, then he would not be 
deportable no matter the category of removal.302 The Board’s 
interpretation of the statute thus treats sovereign pardons as inferior to 
post-conviction judicial resentencing, at least for certain categories of 
removal. All of these problems underscore the federalism concerns 
inherent in the current interpretation of the statute. 
On the other hand, one must confront the fact that reading the 
statute to give effect to pardons in all deportation categories would 
appear to make the INA section mentioning pardons superfluous. 
 
 299 132 S. Ct. 476 (2011). 
 300 Id. at 486.  
 301 Id.; see also id. at 478 (“By hinging a deportable alien’s eligibility for 
discretionary relief on the chance correspondence between statutory categories — a 
matter irrelevant to the alien’s fitness to reside in this country — the BIA has failed to 
exercise its discretion in a reasoned manner.”). 
 302 Powell’s situation was complicated by the fact that he had already been ordered 
removed by the time of Paterson’s pardon, leaving him, at best, with the opportunity 
to make a motion to reopen his proceedings. This complication might explain why he 
sought a pardon instead of judicial resentencing, although there could be other 
reasons such as problems of proof. 
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Perhaps the current pardon provision in the INA is a vestige of that 
first criminal deportation statute in 1917. In light of the common 
understanding in that era that a pardon would restore a person to all 
his rights,303 the 1917 Act plausibly mentioned the preclusive effect of 
pardons to ensure that immigration officials — tasked with 
implementing an immigration scheme that for the first time provided 
for deportation on the basis of state convictions — would continue to 
fully respect the state’s traditional authority to undo the effect of those 
convictions through the sovereign pardon power. Indeed, as 
deportation categories were periodically enacted in the decades 
following the 1917 Act, pardons continued to be held effective for 
each, until Congress made explicit its intention to place controlled 
substances offenses outside the reach of pardons for immigration 
purposes from 1956 to 1990.304 The fact that Congress added multiple 
categories of deportable offenses in 1996 and only placed some in the 
pardon provision section of the INA is more problematic, although the 
legislative sequence leading to the enactment of those immigration 
laws casts some doubt on the underlying intentionality. 
Ultimately, though, it may not be essential to resolve the superfluity 
objection in order to successfully apply the federalism canon here, 
given the range of problems with the immigration agency’s 
construction. Rules of thumb for divining legislative intent, while 
useful tools for statutory interpretation in general, may be 
inappropriate in a wide range of situations.305 Statutory interpretation 
is a holistic endeavor, and the Court has sometimes rejected the plain 
language of a statute where it would lead to an absurd result.306 Even 
“the rule against redundancy does not necessarily have the strength to 
turn a tide of good cause to come out the other way.”307 
 
 303 See supra Parts I.B.1-I.B.2. 
 304 See, e.g., H-, 6 I. & N. Dec. 90, 96 (B.I.A. 1954) (finding “no sound basis in 
logic or reason to hold that this pardoning forgiveness or immunity” does not apply in 
exclusion proceedings as well as deportation proceedings); see also supra Part I.B. 
 305 See LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES 69 (2010). 
 306 See, e.g., United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39, 45 (1994) (rejecting the 
most natural textual reading of a Sentencing Guidelines provision on the grounds that 
it leads to an absurd result); United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 334 (1992) 
(rejecting an interpretation of the Sentencing Reform Act that “would make the award 
of credit [for time-served] arbitrary”); Green v. Block Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 
504, 510 (1989) (“No matter how plain the text of the Rule may be we cannot accept 
an interpretation that would deny a civil plaintiff the same right to impeach an 
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 307 Gutierrez v. Ada, 528 U.S. 250, 258 (2000); see also Landgraf v. USI Film 
Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 259 (1994). 
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On balance, the immigration agency’s interpretation of the effect of 
pardons in the current INA should be rejected if the federalism canon 
is rigorously applied. Congress has not made its intention to override 
the states’ sovereign pardon power unmistakably clear in the statute, 
and there are many reasons to doubt the agency’s construction. Until 
that clarity burden is met, state pardons should be given preclusive 
effect wherever the immigration consequences are predicated on the 
underlying state conviction. 
2. A Brief Look at the Federalism Canon Applied to Other Post-
Conviction Processes 
In this section I will briefly address some of the salient 
considerations in applying the federalism canon to the other post-
conviction processes, though for reasons of scope I reach only 
tentative conclusions. 
As an initial matter, it appears that deferred adjudications and 
diversionary programs are less protected by a federalism canon. In 
addition to the fact that the text explicitly directs that deferred 
adjudications will count as convictions for immigration purposes 
where there has been a finding of guilt and some penalty imposed, 
even if withheld,308 the legislative record suggests that Congress very 
much had such processes in mind when it partially enacted the Ozkok 
definition of conviction.309 Thus, while federal rules reducing the 
viability of diversionary programs or other community supervision 
alternatives to incarceration for noncitizens may be unwise as a matter 
of policy and certainly impose costs on states, they do appear to 
unequivocally reflect Congress’s intent. 
On the other hand, the text of the INA says nothing about whether 
expungements and appeals will affect the immigration consequences 
 
 308 See Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(48)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2011) 
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ordered by a court of law regardless of any suspension of the imposition or execution 
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 309 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 104-828, at 224 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (indicating that 
Congress intended the partial enactment of the Ozkok decision to hold that a 
confession of guilt is sufficient to establish a conviction for immigration purposes, 
even in cases where adjudication is deferred). 
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of a state conviction. As discussed previously, in Matter of Rolden, the 
Board inferred from the INA’s definition of conviction congressional 
intent that any post-conviction processes not addressing the merits 
would be ineffective to remove immigration consequences.310 As the 
dissents in that case noted, however, the legislative record only 
evinced intent to eliminate deferred adjudications and said nothing of 
vacaturs and expungements.311 While courts have deferred to the 
agency’s view that judicial expungements on rehabilitative or 
immigration relief grounds will not remove deportation consequences, 
the lack of uniform implementation of that rule across circuits reflects 
the unclear statutory grounding. 
Similarly, the sharp division among the federal circuits (and 
members of the Board) regarding whether a noncitizen can be 
removed while a direct appeal is pending suggests that the finality 
question too is far from resolved by the statutory text. And there are a 
host of other reasons to doubt a construction of the statute that 
removes the longstanding rule against deporting noncitizens with a 
pending appeal. For example, the Court has recognized that due 
process requires that convicted defendants have a right to meet with 
their attorney to prepare a direct appeal of the conviction,312 and that 
appellate processes must be “adequate and effective.”313 Federal rules 
that allow deportation or mandatory immigration detention before a 
direct appeal is completed cut against this authority. 
Last, but perhaps most importantly, there is no question that 
Congress knows how to textually make clear its desire to override 
state criminal processes for purposes of federal consequences when it 
wishes. The Medicare and Medicaid Patient and Program Protection 
Act of 1987, for example, sets forth mandatory and permissive 
exclusions from state health care programs on the basis of certain 
convictions. The statute defines convictions for purposes of the 
exclusions to include “a judgment of conviction . . . entered against 
the individual or entity by a Federal, State, or local court, regardless of 
whether there is an appeal pending or whether the judgment of conviction 
or other record relating to criminal conduct has been expunged.”314 That 
 
 310 See Matter of Roldan-Santoyo, 22 I. & N. Dec. 512, 527 (B.I.A. 1999). 
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Congress has elsewhere been so explicit where it wants federal rules to 
trump traditional state authority over generally applicable police 
powers justifies application of a strict federalism canon in this context. 
It appears, then, that application of the federalism canon would also 
give preclusive effect to expungements and similar procedures, 
whatever basis the state has for granting them. Similarly, the canon 
seems to easily permit an interpretation of the statute that precludes a 
noncitizen from being deported while his or her conviction is pending 
on direct appeal. With respect to deferred adjudications, on the other 
hand, the statutory text expresses sufficient clarity to overcome the 
federalism canon, a result also supported by the legislative record. 
CONCLUSION 
Current immigration law has been criticized for its severe 
restrictions on discretionary relief and its dragnet approach of 
sweeping in numerous minor offenses under the many provisions 
providing for deportation on the basis of state criminal convictions. 
Compounding the problems this scheme creates, adjudicators in 
charge of administering immigration policies interpret the law to limit 
the authority of states to determine the continuing validity of those 
convictions through core state processes like pardons, appeals, and 
expungements. This interpretation transgresses the ancient principle 
that the sovereign’s power to punish should include the power to 
forgive. 
Ideally, Congress would explicitly clarify through federal legislation 
that it respects state authority to remove the immigration 
consequences of convictions through pardons, expungements, and 
similar procedures. In the meantime, clear statement rules like the 
federalism canon can protect state authority to maintain the systemic 
integrity of criminal justice and exercise membership decisions within 
a traditional sphere of authority. This interpretive safeguard may be 
critical as federal immigration policies become increasingly 
intertwined with state justice structures. While not ultimately 
constraining Congress’s authority to set immigration policy, the 
federalism canon will help ensure that legislators confront the 
federalism values at stake when federal rules invade states’ generally 
applicable criminal laws. 
